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This thesis develops a combat efTectiveness model for the Lance missile system. The
survivability and ability to accomplish the mission for a Lance missile launch platoon
depends upon enemy capabilities, platoon configuration, missile reliability and many
other tangible factors. The changing status of a launch platoon is modeled using a
semi-Markov chain with transient and absorbing states. Expected number of missiles
fired prior to absorption and expected time to absorption are the measures of effective-
ness used to analyze the effect of scenario input. Sensitivity analyses are conducted on
the parameters of platoon configuration, missile reliability and fire point usage.
m
THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may not
have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic er-
rors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without
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A. PERSPECTIVE OF LANCE AND THE AIR LAND BATTLE
What are the repercussions of the recent START agreement to eliminate Pershing
II medium range missiles from Europe? Clearly, NATO is losing its most viable land
based nuclear deterrent and defense against tactical aggression.
Exploring the current United States Military doctrine reveals further impacts of the
decision. During the decade of the 1980s, U.S. military planners have developed and
adopted the combat doctrine called Air Land Battle which relies on the ability to strike
deep into enemy territor}' against second and third echelon forces. Elimination of
Pershing II severely restricts the abiUty of existing forces to strike deep with nuclear
weapons. This puts a heaNy rehance upon air launched weapons and remaining Field
Artillery assets to fulfill the mission.
Success in striking targets well behind enemy lines with Air Force assets is contin-
gent upon air superiority, enemy air defence and weather conditions. Cannon Artillery
is unhampered by these restrictions but lacks sufficient range and destructive power to
meet the need. Our only alternative at this point is to optimize the use of an aging but
reliable weapon system which can meet the range requirements with the necessary fire
power: The Lance Missile.
The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is the future replacement for the
Lance system and represents a vast improvement in range, mobility and lethality.
Whether poUtical diplomacy allows this replacement to occur in continental Europe is
yet to be seen. Currently, however. Lance is the Army's only established long range,
nuclear capable missile in Europe.
B. BASIC DESCRIPTION OF LANCE
Lance is a corps commander's primar\' long range artillery. It gives him an effective,
all weather, day or night, nuclear or conventional weapon system which can engage
priority targets deep in enemy territory. When at sea level, the system can range targets
between 8 and 91 kilometers away with nonnuclear munitions and targets between 8 and
115 kilometers away with nuclear weapons.
1. The Missile
The missile is 6.14 meters long and has two subcomponents, the warhead section
and the main missile assemblage. The warhead section is either nonnuclear (heavy)
consisting of grenades and bomblets which are effective agains soft targets or it is a nu-
clear warhead (light). The main missile assemblage is a liquid propellant rocket engine
system with a inertial guidance system. When in flight the guidance system keeps the
missile oriented on a constant direction and angle of assent and causes the rocket engine
to cut off at a predetermined time. The missile then follows a ballistic trajector\^ to the
target.
In preparation for firing, the missile must be programmed by an on board
(launcher) computer with target parameters such as range and height of burst. The fir-
ing system for Lance missiles is extremely sensitive to enviromental influences such as
humidity and temperature and also the precision with which it is handled. Thus, when
attempting to fire the missile there is a probability of receiving a NO GO based upon
these influences. The missile may still be operational but needs to be inspected and. if
operational, refired.
2. The Launcher
Lance is fired from a self propelled launcher (M752) which is a highly mobile
tracked vehicle that carries all needed fire control equipment. In the conduct of a fire
mission the launcher is located over a surveyed position and oriented in the direction of
fire. The missile is elevated upon an on board launch fixture, oriented for exact direction
using a theodolite and survey technology and fired. The on board launch fixture can
also be extracted from the self propelled launcher and used in another configuration for
special operations, such as airmobile assault missions. Such operations are beyond the
scope of this current model and are not considered or included.
3. The Loader-Transporter
The Loader-Transporter (M688) is a tracked vehicle similar to the launcher and
is designed to assist the launch platoon in ammunition resupply. The Loader-
Transporter carries two complete missiles and has a boom which it uses to transport
missiles on to the launcher. The Loader-Transporter is as mobile as the launcher and
can accompany it if necessary.
4. Firing Points
A Firing point is a tactical location that the launch platoon occupies and fires
the missile from. Because of the long range of Lance and the relatively small probable
error of the inertial guidance system, launch positions must be surveyed for location and
directional control. Lance batteries are equipped with a survey section which has the
capability of ensuring the following: an accuracy ratio of 1:1000 for position closure, ±
2 meters in height, and orienting azimuth accurate to + .0.4 mils.
Normally the commander will choose fire points well in advance in order to al-
low the survey section sufficient time to establish survey control markers and provide
survey data to the launch platoon. Naturally, if survey control markers are disturbed,
removed or never emplaced, the launch platoon must either displace to another fire point
or wait until survey control is reestablish.
5. Organization
A Lance missile launcher is operated by a launch platoon while two Loader-
Transporters are operated by a Ammunition and Transport (A&T) platoon. There are
two launch platoons and one A&T platoon in a Lance batter>' and there are three Lance
batteries in a Lance battahon. The focus of this model will be the Lance launch platoon.
C. LANCE SURVIVABILITY
Because of Lance's extraordinarv' capabihties it has consistently been a high priority
target for Warsaw Pact Nations. Questions are raised repeatedly in Lance survivability
studies about Lance's longevity on the battlefield and its survivability. Lance units will
receive special attention from enemy target aquisition assets and can expect attacks from
enemy artillery, aircraft and ground units.
1. Artillery Attack
The high signature of the missile when fired makes Lance extremely vulnerable
to Field Artillery cannon or missile counter batter\" fire. When fired the missile travels
with an extremely high trajectory, makes a continuous loud noise and leaves a visible
trail of smoke. This enables enemy acquisition units to locate the launch point quickly
and accurately, as well as giving all enemy assets in the vicinity a good idea of the lo-
cation of the source of firing. Cannon or missile attack is then the quickest method of
attack expected.
2. Air Attack
If the enemy has air reconnaissance and air strike capabilities, Lance units be-
come extremely vulnerable while traveling, transloading and preparing to fire. Launch
platoons will always maximize cover and concealment but some operations, such as
transloading, require large open space and are more visible and vulnerable to detection
from the air.
3. Ground Attack
Although Lance units are placed behind foru'ard combat units, they are not safe
from ground attack. Often launch platoons will be sent forward where vulnerability to
detection and attack is higher in order to range deep targets. Enemy long range special
operation patrols (SPETZNAZ) have the specific mission of locating and destroying
high priority targets which include nuclear capable Lance units. These patrols can be
expected to infiltrate rear areas and search out likely locations that Lance units would
use for firing, hiding or carrying out other missions. Once a fire mission has been suc-
cessfully conducted, the signature of the missile will give any patrols in the vicinity a
clear advantage in detecting the Lance units. Even when the Lance units are detected
by other means, SPETZNAZ patrols are expected to quickly be assigned the mission of
finding and destroying such units.
II. OBJECTIVE
A. A BETTER MODEL
In light of Pershing's demise, Lance missile units will be greatly relied upon as a
tactical nuclear deterent. Thus, optimal utilization of Lance is essential. The objective
of this research is to develop a model of a Lance launch platoon using a semi- Markov
process in order to assist planners and decision makers in the evaluation of Lance's ef-
fectiveness and survivability on the battlefield.
This model is prescriptive in the sense that it will be oriented towards battle planning
and wartime operations. It can, however, be used in a descriptive role when incorpo-
rated into larger combat models. The actual function of the model is to analyze the ef-
fect of different sets of assumptions and inputs which describe tactical configurations
and battlefield environments. One goal of this model is to provide a tool for evaluation
of the effectiveness of tactics which are costly to execute in training.
B. MODEL INPUTS
The effectiveness of battle contingencies and procedures for the following situations
cannot be effectively evaluated. It is impossible to test each combat contingency or plan
for all possible combat situations. This model incorporates these situations as model
inputs in order to evaluate their effect.
I. Use of fire points
Often the commander must decide whether to use only fire points which are
unused and undetected or to send a launch platoon to fire points which have been fired
from or are presumed to be detected. For this model a launch platoon on an undetected
point has a probability of becoming detected while a launch platoon on a detected point
has a probability of being destroyed. Fire points are chosen by the commander or
platoon leaders and are surveyed by the survey platoon before use. In the context of this
model, it is assumed that fire points can be produced quickly enough that the
commander can maintain a constant percentage of unused or undetected fire points in-
dependent of the speed of the battle. Although this is seemingly a departure from real-
ism, it enables the model to render guidance concerning the use of detected fire points.
Further attention of this matter is left for further refinement of the model.
2. Travel Routes
A perpetual dilemma for military planners is the choice of routes. The
commander often has a mission which is time critical and must choose between fast
routes with high vulnerability or slower, less vulnerable routes. He must issue guidance
which will best accomplish his mission. In this model the attributes of the routes are
entered as expected travel time and the probability of being destroyed on the route.
3. Rate of Defective Missiles
Because of the age and technology of Lance there may be a high occurrance of
intitial NO-GOs when firing the missiles due to environmental factors, such as temper-
ature and humidity, or even a high percentage of defective missiles. With this model the
user can input the probability of a first time \0-G0 and the probability that a missile
which initially received a NO-GO is not defective and will fire on subsequent attempts.
As a result the commander can then see the larger impact of a high defective rate upon
effectiveness. He can then search for procedures and configurations which optimize ef-
fectiveness in light of a high defective missile rate.
4. Enemy Detection Capabilities
The enemy's capability to locate Lance units can vary immensely. The enemy
may be well equipped and highly trained or ill equipped, fatigued and ineffective. Based
on the intelligence estimate the user can input information to reflect the Lance platoon's
vulnerability to detection and also to ensuing artiller>', air or ground attack during op-
erations.
5. Operational Readiness of Organic Equipment
Equipment breakdown, specifically vehicular breakdowns, will impact greatly
upon combat effectiveness of a Lance platoon. Poor or insufficient attention to equip-
ment maintenance will mean more frequent breakdowns and consequently higher vul-
nerability to attack and lower effectiveness. In the model the user can enter the
probability of vehicular breakdown while traveling and observe the eflecis.
6. Platoon configuration
How will launch platoon configuration with respect to the Loader-Transporter
affect vulnerability and effectiveness for different situations? The Lance platoon may
be configured with a Loader-Transport which allows the platoon to reload immediately.
The model allows three configurations which are explained in detail in Chapter V.
Often a launch platoon is ordered to lay the missile and wait until a specific
command to fire is given as opposed to firing at a predetermined time or when ready.
This method of fire may increase the vulnerability to detection and destruction depend-
ing upon the amount of time a launch platoon must wait. The model provides for this
aspect of operations.
C. MODEL OUTPUT
There are two outputs of this model which are desirable measures of effectiveness
(.MCE) for the decisions input into the model. The user can manipulate environmental
or decision variables in order to observe their effects on an MOE or pursue optimality
of the MOE.
1. Measure of Effectiveness One
The first measure of effectiveness is the number of missiles that are fired before
the Lance platoon is destroyed.
2. Measure of Effectiveness Two
The second measure of effectiveness is the amount of time that the Lance
platoon survives in combat. This may be of greater importance than number of missiles
fired if longevity of nuclear capable assets is critical.
D. STOCHASTIC/ANALYTICAL APPROACH
A stochastic process is used in this thesis to model the Lance platoon because the
successive operations of a Lance platoon in combat can be easily represented by a dis-
crete time Markov Chain.
1. Nature of Lance
In combat a Lance platoon conducts operations in definitive states and contin-
ually transitions from one type of operation to another. This model represents these
operations states. The platoon will begin operating in a state, and remain in that state
until the objective of that state is completed or until an event occurs which causes the
platoon to leave the state prematurely and enter another. For example, if the platoon
is in the state of traveling to a fire point, there is a probability that it arrives at the fire
point; the state may then change to laying the missile. There is also a probability of
being attacked and destroyed en route to the fire point, which means transitioning to an
absorption state. From each state the platoon has a probability of transitioning to other
states. The transition probabilities are based on the tactical situation and commanders
guidance. Many of these states are reported to the battery Fire Direction Center (FDC).
2. Analytic Solution
There is an advantage to using a stochastic, analytic model instead of a simu-
lation. This stochastic model is an analytical analysis of the situation and not an at-
tempt to create possible outcomes by generating situations using a Monte Carlo process.
According to Leibholz in Miliiary Modeling
"A well-executed analytical model can provide answers in less than prodigal time --
answers both as sound and as defensible as any simulation.. .A simulation model can
represent more complex situations and interactions than a corresponding analytical
model. However, it is inevitably more expensive and less flexible than the analytical
model, and introduces simulation noise into the results." [Ref. 1: p. 339]
a. Run time
The model MOE's are obtained numerically. The numerical operations are
primarily matrix manipulation and inversion. APL 2.0 takes about two seconds of run
time to achieve a solution once the the input data have been entered or manipulated.
There is also no need for replication because this is not a Monte Carlo simulation.
b. Versatility
There are other weapons systems which are similar to the Lance Missile
deliverv' system which could adopt a variation of a Lance model for combat analysis.
For example, the Patriot air defense missile and the Multiple Launch Rocket System
(MLRS) operate in fashions similar to Lance, especially with respect to transitioning
states. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), the future replacement for
Lance, is a variation of the MLRS weapon system and will be easily modeled using an
adaptation to a MLRS model. It is hoped that interest in analytical models for these
weapon systems will be enhanced by this model for Lance.
3. Feeder for Other Models
An additional objective of this model is to create a feeder for higher level ag-
gregated combat models. In the hierarchy of Army combat models "analytic models are
frequently employed as the lower-level combat models internal to the higher-level mod-
els. To perform this role and provide a useful model of higher-echelon operations, it is
very desirable that such models have very short running times. "[Ref. 1: p. 156] Not only
is this type of model quick but the inputs and outputs could be the linked to other sim-
ilar models to enable interaction between entities on the battlefield.
4. Detail
With this type of model, many variables can be included and easily manipulated
for evaluation, adding resolution and complexity with an increase in the number of fac-
tors. However, the output will still be a quick and accurate analytical solution.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. MARKOV CHAINS
Much has already been stated in this text about how the Lance system operates in
states. The successive states that a Lance platoon is in can be modeled by a disrete time
Markov process. A definition of a Markov process is offered by Taylor and Karlin in
"An Introduction to Stochastic Modeling":
"A Markov Process [X,] is a stochastic process with the property that, given the
value of X, , the values of X, for s> t are not influenced by the values of A'„ for
u < t. In words, the probability of any particular future behaviour of the process,
when its current state is known exactly, is not altered by additional knowledge con-
cerning its past behavior. A discrete lime Markov chain is a Markov process whose
state space is a finite or countable set, and whose (time) inJe\ set is
T= (0, 1.2,.. .}. In formal terms, the Markov property is that
Prl-'^rt+l ~J I '^0 = 'O' • • • ' ^n-\ — '^-1' '"^n — '}
= ?r[X,^,=j\X, = i] (I)
for all time points n and all states /r, /,_,, ij. The probability of .V,^i being in state
j given that A', is in state / is called the one-step transition probability and is denoted
by P^;"-K That is,
p;-"^' = Pr{.v,^,=yu; = /} (2)
The notation emphasizes that in general the transition probabilities are func-
tions not only of the initial and final states, but also of the time of transition as well.
When the one-step transition probabilities are independent of the time variable n,
we say that the Markov chain has stationary transition probabilities." [Ref 2: p. 67]
The successive states of a Lance platoon will be modeled by a discrete time Markov
Chain. For the Lance model, the probability of the platoon transitioning from state /
to state y in the n"" time transition step is
Pj-"^' = Py (3)
meaning that the probability of transitioning to a state in one step depends only upon
the state where it is presently operating, independent of what transition it is. The State
Space refers to all possible states in which the launch platoon can exist.
The values of P,y for a discrete time Markov chain are customarily arranged in a
matrix similar to the following example which represents a stale space oi" five states
(0, 1, 2, 3, 4,}:
p =
^00 ^01 P02 P03 •'04
^10 ^I. Pn Pl3 ^.4
P20 Pl^ P22 P22 P2.
P30 Pn P22 P23 P3.
^40 P,x P^i P.3 P44
(-4)
This matrix P is known as the Probability Transistion Matrix.
The quantities P,^ must satisfy the following conditions:
Pij>0 for /,y = 0, 1,2 ,
^/>^.= 1 for / = 0,1,2 {^)
y=o
In words, all P,^ values must be nonnegative and add to one across a row.
A discrete time Markov chain is completely defined once its transition probability
matrix and initial state Xq (or, more generally, the probability distribution of X,^) are
specified. In the Lance application, the probability distribution of Xq for this model can
differ according to the tactical situation.
B. SEMI-MARKOV PROCESS
The Lance model is actually a semi-Markov process. A Semi-Markov process differs
from the discrete time Vlarkov chain in that the process may sojourn in a state / for a
random time with mean ix, before transitioning to another state y, independent of how
the process arrived at state /. [Ref 3: p. 292] For the Lance model, all sojourn times
considered are mixtures of constant times. Each constant time is dependent upon / , the
present state of the process, andy, the state to which the process is transitioning. The
mean value of the sojourn time,
^,
, is given by the relationship:
s
(6)
where t,j is a constant representing the sojourn time in state / when after the next tran-
sition the process is in statej . P,^ is the probability of transitioning from state / to state
J. Developing a T^ matrix for the Lance model is addressed later in this thesis.
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C. EVALUATION OF MOMENTS FOR AN ABSORBING MARKOV CHAIN AND
AN ABSORBING SEMI-MARKOV PROCESS
Taylor and Karlin derive and explain the evaluation of moments for an absorbing
Markov process and an absorbing semi-Markov process.
"Consider a Markov Chain whose states are labeled 0, 1, . . . ,N. States
0, I, . . . , r - 1 are transient in that ?<;> -» as n -» od for < ij < r vi^hile states r, .
. ., iV are absorbing, or trap, and here P^^ =1 for r ^ / < N. The transition matrix
has the form
P = Q R
I
(7)
where is an {S — r 4- 1) x r matrix all of whose components are zero. I is an
(iV - /- + 1) X (.V - /- + 1) identity matrix and Q,j = P,j for < iJ < r".[Ref 2: p. 1 16]
They then develop the fundamental matrix, W, which is defmed as
W = (I-Qr\ (8)
The values w,^ ofW are the expected number of visits to stated before absorption given
that the Markov chain initially started in state /.. [Ref 2: pp. 117-118]
Using a as a column vector of the expected sojourn times we obtain the expected
times to absorption for the semi-Markov model from the relation
T.,, = W^ (9)
The expected time prior to absorption given that the semi-Markov process started in
state / is equal to vv,,/i,
Once the transition matrix for Lance is arranged in accordance with equation 7,
these relationships are used in this thesis to evaluate the semi-Markov chain. The
mathematical relationships are incorporated into an APL program, SOLVE (Appendix
M), which is used to solve for the expected number of times the process visits a state
(Missile shot) and the expected time until absorption. For this model the semi-Markov
process begins in states which represent a launch platoon prior to battle. All executions
of the programs assume that the launcher starts in hiding at an undetected fire point




The approach used in building this model is to take Lance tactics and technical
procedures and represent them as states in a Markov Chain. As mentioned earlier,
Lance operations can be represented as discrete events because the platoon is capable
of conducting only one operation at a time. For example, the platoon cannot lay the
missile and travel simultaneously. The Markov Chain in this model is a series of states
which represent all possible tactical situations.
B. TACTICS
As with all Field Artillery units, the pro-words which describe Lance's tactical ob-
jectives are "SHOOT, MOVE, AND COMMUNICATE." All decisions made in combat
concentrate on these three objectives in order to maximize artillery fires and increase
survivability.
1. Tactical Configurations
Depending upon the tactical situation, the Lance platoon can take three differ-
ent configurations which relate to the attachment of a Loader-Transporter.
a. Configuration One
In the first configuration the Loader-Transporter accompanies the launch
platoon to the fire points so that new missiles can be transloaded onto the launcher im-
mediately.
b. Configuration Two
In the second configuration a Loader-Transporter operates with the launch
platoon but is positioned at a local transload point in the general vicinity while the
launch platoon conducts a mission at the fire point.
c. Configuration Three
In the third configuration the launcher operates without a Loader-
Transporter and is therefore required to travel to the central transload point each time
a new missile is required.
2. Ammunition
The Lance missile launcher can carry only one missile at a time while the
Loader-Transporter can carry two. Therefore, there are three possible ammunition
configurations in which the platoon can operate which depend upon the tactical config-
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uration. In this model these ammunition configurations are represented by three levels
of activity which are similar except for the ammunition status. Once a missile is fired
(or rejected) the launch platoon transitions to a state which is in a lower level of activity.
Once the platoon is replenished it moves to a higher level of activity. This organization
into levels simplifies computation of the P matrix.
• Level One: The launch platoon is in tactical configuration one or two and has one
missile on the launcher and two missiles on an accompanying Loader-Transporter.
• Level Two: The launch platoon is in tactical configuration one or two and has one
missile on the launcher but only one missile on an accompanying Loader-
Transporter.
• Level Three: The launch platoon has only one missile on the launcher and no mis-
siles on the Loader-Transporter.
C. EXPLANATION OF TERMS
The following terms are used in explaining states involved in this model.
• Hide: The Launch Platoon is near the fire point camoufiaged to decrease vulner-
ability.
• Lay: Launcher is placed over a surveyed position and oriented for direction. All
firing procedures are conducted and the missile is raised to firing elevation.
• Shoot: The missile leaves the launcher.
• Misfire: The launch platoon attempts to shoot the missile but encounters a tech-
nical difficulty. This may be due to improper handling procedures, a defective
missile or an electronic malfuntion (NO-GO).
• Transload: Operation of lifting a missile from the Loader-Transporter and placing
it onto the launcher. This can be done an\'where there is room enough to pull the
vehicles together. In this model the platoon conducts transload operations in ac-
cordance with the tactical configuration.
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V. DEVELOPING THE PROBABILITY TRANSITION MATRIX (PIJiM)
A. METHODOLOGY
The burden of work in producing the Lance model was in developing the state space.
This was a process of ensuring that all tactical situations which are to be modeled are
represented by a state. It is of critical importance that the state space represents a
Markov chain as described in Chapter III. Each state can represent only one unique set
of circumstances.
Once the state space is defined, P, the probability transition matrix can be devel-
oped. This was done by writing a series of APL programs which create a zero matrix
corresponding to the size of the state space and then fill the appropriate entries with the
values of P,^
B. STATE SPACE
Ninety-three states are needed in this model to represent Lance missile platoon op-
erations. The first eighty-eight are transition states and the last five are absorption
states.
1. Transition States
The eighty-eight transition states are arranged into three levels of activity which
have similar characteristics with respect to tactics but differ in ammunition status.
For ease in explaining and reviewing concepts in this thesis and manipulating
matrices in APL, the initial state is designated as state one. Thus the transition matrix









The first level (states I to 33) represents all possible states which can occur
when a launch platoon is accompanied by a Loader-Transporter (LT) carrving two ad-
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ditional missiles. Appendix A consists of tables which give explicit descriptions of the
states in the first level of activity.
• States 1 to 8 represent the Lance platoon when conducting fire operations at an
undetected fire point. (Tables 6 and 7)
• States 9 to 19 represent the Lance platoon when conducting fire operations at a
detected fire point. (Tables 8 and 9)
• States 20 to 33 represent the Lance platoon when conducting transload operations.
(Tables 10 and 11)
b. Level Two
The second level (states 34 to 66) is similar to the first except the Loader-
Transporter is carrying only one additional round, because the other has been fired or
found defective. Appendix B consists of tables which describe states in the second level
of activity.
• States 34 to 41 represent the Lance platoon when conducting fire operations at an
undetected fire point. (Tables 12 and 13)
• States 42 to 52 represent the Lance platoon when conducting fire operations at a
detected fire point. (Tables 14 and 15)
• States 53 to 66 represent the Lance platoon when conducting transload operations.
(Tables 16 and 17)
c. Level Three
The third level (states 67 to 88) represents all possible states which can oc-
cur when a launch platoon has no additional missiles. Appendix C consists of tables
which describe states in the third level.
• States 67 to 74 represent the Lance platoon when conducting fire operations at an
undetected fire point. (Tables 18 and 19)
• States 75 to 85 represent the Lance platoon when conducting fire operations at a
detected fire point. (Tables 20 and 21)
• States 86 to 88 represent the Lance platoon when conducting transload operations
at the batter>" area. (Table 22)
The three levels of states are interrelated by transition probabilities which
lead from one level of ammunition status to another as missiles are fired or rejected as
defective. The transition from one level of activity to another occurs only from trans-
load states.
2. Absorption States
States 89 to 93 are the absorbing states which represent destruction or
neutralization of the launch platoon by enemy attack. Once the process arrives in an
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absorbing state, it never exits the state. Thus the probability of staying an absorbing
state is always one. The absorbing states are listed in Appendix D.
C. INTERACTIVE APL PROGRAMS
Assigning all transition probabilities and transition times for each of the 93 states
includes up to 2700 entries and is clearly time intensive. More importantly, the user of
such a model must assess each transition probability and transition time in order to enter
a realistic value for each entry. Although possible, such a task is too labor intensive for
multiple situations and would not be worth the effort required to run the model.
1. APL Program "PROGVAR"
In order to make this task easier for the user and allow expedient manipulation
of matrix values, APL program PROGVAR creates the 93 by 93 matrix and prompts the
user to enter the platoons's current tactical configuration. PROGVAR then elicits from
the user a series of probabilities related to independent tactical events. The P matrix
represents only one tactical configuration at a time. Therefore, transition probabilities
related to other than the current tactical configurations will be assigned a value of zero.
The events referred to are not states but rather tactical events which, when combined
with other tactical events, are used to produce the probability of transitioning from one
state to another.
Vlany of the user decisions are entered as events in PROGVAR, such as abort-
ing a mission, that are not represented as a specific state. The programmer enters the
probabilities of these events occuring (eg., the probability of being destroyed while
traveling to a fire point) as a decimal value between zero and one. Appendix E gives a
description of each input along with values used in this analysis as a basic scenario.
Appendix G is a listing of the APL language for PROGVAR.
PROGVAR stores this information in a vector (VAR) and calls three other
programs, PROGIMTX, PROG2MTX AND PROG3MTX, to compile P, the proba-
bility transition matrix. These three programs use basic laws of probability and the as-
sumption of independence between events to calculate a tree of P,j values. An example
is given in Figure 1.
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?
= PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED
P = PROBABILITY OF ABORTING MISSION
2






Figure 1. Example of the Probability Tree for State 16.
Through this method of computing P^j, the addition of all entries in the P matrix
across a row always equals one. The advantage of this methodology is that vector en-
tries can be easily manipulated /or analysis and the entire P matrix adjusted accordingly.
This precludes the user from reentering all event data before every execution of the
program. PROGIMTX, PR0G2MTX AND PR0G3MTX are listed in Appendices H,
I, and J, respectively.
1. APL Program "PROGTIME"
The program PROGTIME creates the Time Transition matrix (TIJM in APL)
in a fashion similar to PROGVAR's methodology. The program prompts the user to
enter the amount of time in minutes that a specific type of event is expected to take and
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enters the information into a vector (TIME). An explanation of PROGTIME's indi-
vidual inputs and the values used for the basic scenario are given in Appendix K.
PROGTIME then calls another program, TIMEMTX (Appendix L), which enters the
information stored in vector TIME into the appropriate locations of the T matrix.
Again, because the information is stored in a vector before the matrix is compiled, the
entries in the vector are easily manipulated and the T matrix adjusted accordingly.
3. APL Program "SOLVE"
Once the P and T matrices are completed, APL program SOLVE uses the
methodologies described in Chapter III to solve for the expected number of missiles fired
before absorption and the expected time, in hours, until absorption. SOLVE is listed in
Appendix M.
4. APL Program "CONFIGURE"
Program CONFIGURE was written to assist the user to chanee the tactical
configuration of the P matrix. After CONFIGURE prompts the user to enter the con-
figuration, it adjusts certain variables in vector VAR which act as switches. These
switches cause the probability of transitioning to states which are not allowed in a con-
figuration to be zero. For example, a launch platoon in configuration two or three is
not accompanied to the fire point by a Loader-Transporter. Therefore, it is prohibited
from transitioning to the states which represent the launch platoon transloading while
en route to a fire point. CONFIGURE then calls PROGIMTX, PR0G2MTX,
PR0G3MTX and TIMEMTX in order to create new P and T matices. CONFIGURE
is listed in Appendix N.
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VI. ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the transparency and sensitivity of the
model to selected input parameters. Large numbers of runs were conducted to ensure
that the trends exhibited from parameter variations satisfied the "militar>- judgment"
validation test. Only a few of these are presented in this chapter. In each case, the re-
sults of the parameter variations over the three configurations and two MOE's are pre-
sented. In addition, "military judgement" is applied to describe why the results occurred
and to emphasize the transparency of model results to input variations. With this model
the commander has the ability to observe the effect of external variables as well as
choices he might make as a tool to help him make decisions.
Once the Lance model was completely developed in the APL computer language, the
sensitivity of the model to changing scenarios became evident through use. Retracing
the Markov chain lent great credibility to the output and showed that there is an at-
tainable explanation for each result. Evaluation of Lance in hkely combat scenarios
showed that varying some input parameters impacted significantlv on one or both
Measures of ElTectiveness (MOEs). In order to present this sensitivity, a basic scenario
was entered and three variations of the scenario were manipulated and examined.
A. BASIC INPUT SCENARIO
In the interest of time, information availability and document classification, the au-
thor developed subjective input values for programs PROGVAR and PROGTIME
based on his experience with Lance units (see Appendix B). Classified data for input
values are not used for this presentation. Instead, the focus of this analysis is directed
towards the function of the model. Thus, conclusions drawn about Lance operations for
this analysis apply only for this scenario. The input data remain constant throughout
this chapter except for explained manipulations which were made for demonstration
purposes. All time inputs are in minutes but, in order to better observe performance, the
output (MOE Two) is in hours. The basic scenario is listed in Appendices E and F.
B. ASPECT ONE: TACTICAL CONFIGURATION
The first aspect considered was tactical configuration. The program was run three
times, once for each tactical configuration, using the basic input scenario. The results
are recorded in Table 1.
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The commander choosing a configuration which maximizes the number of mis-
siles fired will look for the configuration with the highest value for the first Measure of
Effectiveness. For MOE One, the expected number of missiles fired prior to being de-
stroyed (absorption), Configuration One ranked highest and Configuration Three, low-
est. Therefore, choosing Configuration One allows the launch platoon to fire one more
missile {expected value) than the better of the other two configurations (Configuration
Two).
Configuration One outperformed the others in the expected number of missiles
fired because the launch platoon moves less frequently. After a fire mission the launch
platoon in Configuration Two or Three must move once to the transload point or bat-
tery area and then back to a fire point. In Configuration One the launch platoon moves
only once to the next fire point while transloading en route, but might not move at all
if it transloads on the fire point. For this scenario the vulnerability to destruction as-
sociated with these movements outweighed the vulnerability associated with transload-
ing at or en route to a fire point.
2. MOE Two
For MOE Two, Configuration Three ranked the highest because it takes much
longer in this configuration to fire a missile. Effectively, the launch platoon spends more
time traveling than it does shooting while in this configuration.
3. Trade Off
This example presents a trade-off for the commander to consider. In choosing
Configuration Three over Configuration One he gains 2.6 hours expected survival time
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but loses the ability to fire an expected value of 1.5 missiles. He must evaluate this
trade-off based on his current and anticipated future missions.
The ratio of MOE Two to MOE One gives the average rate at which the launch
platoon fires a missiles.
• Configuration One fires one missile every 2.57 hours.
• Configuration Two fires one missile every 2.75 hours.
• Configuration Three fires one missile every 3.44 hours.
These rates are reasonable with respect to the input scenario. Notice that
Configuration Three's rate reflects a greater travel time to and from the fire points per
missile fired. Also note that the number of missiles fired for Configuration Three is ver\'
close to that of Configuration Two. One would expect Configuration Two to fire more
missiles than Configuration Three because the rate of fire is higher. Scrutiny of the input
values revealed the vulnerability during transload at a local transload point (Configura-
tion Two) to be significantly higher than for the batter>" area (Configuration Three).
This allowed a platoon in Configuration Three to survive long enough to make up for
a slow rate of fire.
C. ASPECT TWO: MISSILE RELIABILITY
The next example relates to Lance operations as missile reliability is diminished.
Missile reliability in this model is the probability that a missile will fire. Quantitatively,
the defective rate is defined as the product of the probability of receiving a first time
NO-GO (misfire) and the probabihty that the missile will not fire on subsequent attempts
(one minus the probability that it will fire on subsequent attempts).
There is an infinite number of combinations of these factors for each defective rate
and each combination will have a different effect upon the output, because each of these
events occur at different locations in the sequence of events. For this analysis, the input
values for the probability of first time NO-GO (Input 45) and the probability that a
missile which was a first time NO-GO, is not defective (Input 46) were adjusted from the
base scenario and the results examined. No other parameters were changed.
1. Decreased Missile reliability
First, Input 45 was raised from O.l to 0.5 while Input 46 was lowered from 0.9
to 0.5. This represents an increase in the overall defective missile rate from 0.01 (basic
scenario) to 0.25. The results in Table 2 show that MOE One decreased and .VIOE Two
increased for all configurations.
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These results are understandable since the platoon will spend more time travel-
ing and transloading missiles than before and will have fewer successful fire missions.
Because there are fewer missiles fired per attempt, vulnerability to enemy detection and
subsequent attack, are reduced, increasing expected longevity. The increase in the aver-
age time taken to fire a missile verifies this result.
• Configuration One fires one missile every 3.54 hours.
• Configuration Two fires one missile ever>' 3.87 hours.
• Configuration Three fires one missile ever}' 4.84 hours.
2. Further Decreased Missile Reliability
Table 3 contains the results of further increasing Input 45 from 0.5 to 0.7 and
lowering Input 46 from 0.5 to 0.3. This brings the overall defective missile rate to 0.49.



















MOE One continued to decrease and MOE Two continued to increase for all
configurations. The times taken to fire have increased, as can be expected.
• Configuration One fires one missile every 5.26 hours.
• Configuration Two fires one missile every 5.88 hours.
• Configuration Three fires one missile every 7.41 hours.
3. Overview
Figures 2 and 3 provide the reader visual representations of what happens to the




























Figure 2. Analysis of Aspect One: MOE ONE
a. MOE One
When the defective missile rate is increased from 0.01 to 0.49, there are
overall decreases in the expected number of missiles fired for the respective configura-
tions of 3.58, 3.82 and 3.66. This gives the impression that there is a "standard " loss of
about 3.7 missiles fired for each configuration. There was no evidence found in the
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Markov chain or input data to support a generalization of a "standard " loss result across
configurations.
However, it was noted that the decreases for Configurations One and Two
were both 48 percent of the original expected number of missiles fired while the decrease
for Configuration One was 40 percent. Inspection of the input data and the Markov
chain showed this to be reasonable. Because Configurations Two and Three cause the
launch platoon to leave the fire point in order to transload, a fire mission being suc-
cessful had Httle impact upon the vulnerability to destruction. Instead, the vulnerabili-
ties to destruction depend more on the number of trips to the transload point than on
the number of successful fire missions.
Therefore, the change in the expected number of missiles fired is nearly
equivalent to the rate of defective missiles. Configuration One's survivabihty, however,
is more dependant upon the number of successful fire missions, since the launch platoon
transloads a portion of the time on the fire point. After a successful fire mission the
launch platoon becomes more vulnerable to destruction. If the percentage of defective
missiles is increased, the proportion of transloads on a fire point after a successful fire
mission decreases. Because the vulnerability has decreased, the platoon has the oppor-
tunity to attempt more fire missions. Thus the percentage decrease in number of missiles
fired is somewhat less than the increase in defective missile rate (40 percent verses 49
percent).
b. MOE Two
Notice that the expected survival time for Configurations One and Three
are essentially equivalent (Table 3 and Figure 2). The previous advantage Configuration
Three had in longevity has diminished significantly. When transloading at the transload
point (Configuration One), an increase in the defective missile rate increases the number
of transloads conducted after misfires, decreasing vulnerability to destruction. The rel-
ative vulnerability elsewhere in the process, (eg., because of the increased travel time)
goes up. In effect, as the reliability decreases. Configuration One spends increasingly
more time traveling and transloading per missile fired.
The vulnerability assosiated with Configuration Two and Three is more de-
pendent upon the number of transloads and trips to the transload point than the pro-
portion of successful fire missions. As the defective missile rate increases, the change in
the number of transloads before destruction is less significant for Configurations Two
and Three than it is for Configuraton One. After a fire mission, a launch platoon in
Configuration Two or Three must move to the transload point or battery area to trans-
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Figure 3. Analysis of Aspect One: MO E TWO
load, whether the missile is fired or defective. As the proportion of transloads due to
defective missiles increases, the increase in expected survival time for Configurations
Two and Three will be sienificantlv less than for Configuration One. Notice the dis-
parity between Configuration One's increase in expected longevity and that of the others
as the missile defective rate increased from 0.01 to 0.49:
• Configuration One is expected to survive 5.51 hours longer.
• Configuration Two is expected to survive 2.62 hours longer.
• Configuration Three is expected to survive 2.84 hours longer.
These differences in increase caused the expected survival time for Config-
uration One to caich up with the expected survival time for Configuration Three. The
increase in expected survival time for Configuration Two was approximately equivalent
to that of Configuration Three. This left the MOE Two for Configuration Two (24.56
hours) noticably less the other configurations (Table 3).
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D. ASPECT THREE: FIRE POINT USAGE
One of the decisions the commander must make is whether to send his launch
platoons to fire points which are considered detected by the enemy. There may be a
trade-off in work, expended to keep a high number of new or undetected fire points sur-
veyed.
Fire point usage, specifically the percentage of fire points considered detected which
are used in fire missions, is the third aspect of the model examined. When the launch
platoon has finished transloading (at other than the fire point), there is a probability that
the next fire point selected is detected. For this evaluation the percentage of firing points
which are detected was increased in order to observe the impact on the two MOEs.
1. Increasing the percentage of detected fire points
Initially the percentage of detected fire points was increased from 0.1 (from the
base scenario) to 0.5. This means that after transloading, the platoon has a probability
of 0.5 of going to a fire point which is considered detected. The results of this change
are listed in Table 4.



















Notice the decrease in both MOEs across the configuration types. The rate of
fu-e changed little from that of the base scenario:
• Configuration One fires one missile ever>' 2.59 hours.
• Configuration Two fires one missile every 2.76 hours.
• Configuration Three fires one missile every 3.50 hours.
2. Further increasing the percentage of detected fire points
The percentage of detected fire points was further increased from 0.5 to 0.9. (See
Table 5).
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Both MOEs continued to decrease for all configurations and the rank orders did
not change. However, comparisons of expected survival hours gained per decrease in
expected missiles fired between Configurations Three and One provide an important
observation, particularly when comparing Table 5 with Table 1. From Table 1 (basic
scenario), the difference between the expected number of missiles fired for Configuration
One and Configuration Three divided by the difference between the expected time until
absorption for these two configurations gives a ratio is (2.65; 1.51)= 1.76 survival hours
gained per loss in expected missiles fired when choosing Configuration Three over Con-
figuration One. The corresponding result for fewer undetected fire points (Table 5) is
(2.98,0.95)= 3.13 survival hours gained per missile lost when choosing Configuration
Three over One. Thus, as the number of undetected fire points is reduced, the relative
advantage of Configuration Three over Configuration One with respect to expected
survival time gained per missile lost is reduced. Finally, there was little affect on the rate
of fire:
• Configuration One fires one missile every 2.60 hours.
• Configuration Two fires one missile every 2.78 hours.
• Configuration Three fires one missile every 3.57 hours.
3. Overview
The decreases in these MOEs, as shown in Figures 4 and 5 were large. In-
spection of the Markov chain showed that the effect of changing the percentage of de-
tected fire points depends upon the vulnerability to destruction while at a detected fire
point, which is reasonable. Comparing the changes in MOEs when increasing the pro-
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portion of detected fire points from 10 to 50 percent to the changes in MOEs when fur-
ther increasing the percentage from 50 percent to 90 percent gave interesting results.
The change in both MOEs as a result of the first increase in proportion of detected fire
points was significantly greater than the change as a result of the subsequent (equal)
increase in the proportion of detected fire points. This is especially apparent for MOE































Figure 4. Analysis of Aspect Two: MOE ONE
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Figure 5. Analysis of Aspect Two: MOE TWO
Again a review of the Markov chain shows that as more detected fire points are
used, vulnerability to destruction at the fire point increases, adversely affecting both
measures of effectiveness. Notice, however, that there is a probability that a fire mission
will be aborted at the detected fire point and the launcher sent to an undetected fire
point (unrelated to the percentage of detected fire points) in order to preclude de-
struction. Therefore, as the percentage of detected fire points increases, the percentage
of this type of aborted fire mission also increases. This has a slowing effect on the rate
of increase in the use of detected fire points and likewise slows down the rate of decrease
in vulnerability. For this reason the values of the MOEs are not linearly related to per-
centage of fire points detected.
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0.01 to 0.25 1.410 1.202 1.071
0.25 to 0.49 1.028 0.886 0.804











0.01 to 0.25 3.500 3.195 3.274
0.25 to 0.49 2.562 2.361 2.457
4. Conclusion
This Semi-Markov model has a great advantage over large scale simulation
models in its ability to make caus effect relationships more transparent to the user. In
this model, the Markov chain and the input variables can be reviewed in order to un-
derstand and explain results. It must be remembered that results and conclusions de-
rived from this model always depend upon the input data. Varying situations give
different outputs, rankings and conclusions.
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VII. SUMMARY
Lance will remain as the primary land based nuclear deterant in continental Europe
until at least the mid 1990s. Now, in the absence of Pershing II missiles, NATO must
take special interest in Lance's abilities. Is Lance able to accomplish the mission? How
efficiently will Lance be used in combat? The semi-Markov Lance model presented in
this thesis is a tool designed to answer these questions.
The model proves to be sensitive to scenario input. It allows the user to input and
manipulate command decisions and then observe the results. Output from the model in
the form of number of rounds fired and time until absorption is tangible and easily un-
derstood. The model might be improved if the probabilty of being detroyed or being
detected were a function of time spent in the state rather than a constant.
There are further uses of the Lance model. Changes in tactical doctrine can be en-
tered as model input or the APL code can be easily altered, if necessar>'. Projected ad-
ditions or changes in equipment configurations can be entered in the same manner to
evaluate their impact upon combat effectiveness.
A semi-Markov process proved to be useful in modeling Lance and has great po-
tential for modeling other systems. This could be a starting point for developing models
of other related artillerv" missile systems. Much could be learned if a model were now
developed for ATACMS, the replacement for Lance, while the system is being developed
and tactical doctrine for the system is being written. Results from such a model could
be compared with results of the Lance model to evaluate and justify the aquisition of
ATACMS.
The greatest potential of this type of combat model is its ability to be incorporated
into other combat models. Analytical models such as Markof chain models can quickly
receive input from other models to be used to adjust their transition matrices. After
evaluation, the ensuing results would be used as input by other similar models which
would adjust their respective transition matrices accordingly. Such a system of models
would take full advantage of the attributes of analytical models.
With changing political environments and increasing technology in our age, combat
models can give an edge to military planning and preparation for future missions. It is





LEVEL ONE STATES CONCERNING UNDETECTED FIRE POINTS:







En route to an undetected fire point without a fire mission: The
platoon travels fi-om the battery- position to a fire point and goes
to a hide position (state 5) near the fire point.
2, 5, 92
2
Down en route to an undetected fire point without a fire mission:
A vehicle has broken down and stops the platoon fi-om traveling
until it is repaired or replaced. The platoon still has no mission.
5,92
3
En route to an undetected fire point with a fire mission: This is
same as State 1 except in this state the launch platoon has re-
ceived a fire mission and goes straight to the fire point (state 6).
4, 6. 92
4
Down en route to undetected fire point with a mission: Same
as State 2 except the platoon has received a fire mission. If the
mission is aborted because of the break down the platoon will
go to a hide position near the fire point (state 5).
5, 6. 92
5
In hide position at an undetected fire point: The platoon is near
an undetected fire point, camouflaged and waiting for a fire
mission. When the mission comes the platoon goes to the fire
point (state 6). If the platoon becomes detected while waiting it
transitions to state 14.
6, 14
6
On an undetected fire point with a mission laying: The platoon
has a fire mission and is on an undetected fire point laying the
missile. The platoon may receive orders to fire "At My Com-
mand" (state 7). If not the platoon will either fire successfully
(state 19) or misfire (state 8).
7, 8, 19
7
On an undetected fire point laid awaiting fire command: The
platoon is on an undetected fire point with all firing procedures
completed but has been given the order to fire "At My Com-
mand." When the command to fire is received the platoon fires
(state 19) or misfires (state 8). There is a probability that the
platoon becomes detected (state 16).
8, 16, 19
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Table 9. LEVEL ONE STATES CONCERNING UNDETECTED FIRE POINTS:







Misfire on an unused fire point: The platoon attempted to fire
the missile but received a NO-GO in launch procedures. The
platoon conducts misfire procedures, checks out the missile and
again attempts to fire the missile. If the missile fires then the
platoon transitions to state 19. If the missile is defective then,
depending upon the tactical configuration, the platoon either
transloads another missile onto the launcher at the fire point




Table 10. LEVEL ONE STATES CONCERNING DETECTED FIRE POINTS:







En route to detected fire point without a fire mission: The
launch platoon is en route from the batter>- position to a fire
point which is assumed to be detected by the enemy. Because it




Down en route to a detected fire point without a fire mission:




En route to detected fire point with a mission: This is same as
State 9 except the platoon has received a fire mission and goes




Down en route to a detected fire point with a mission: This is
same as State 10 except the platoon has received a fire mission.
If the fire mission is aborted because of the breakdown, the




Table 11. LEVEL ONE STATES CONCERNING DETECTED FIRE POINTS:
LAUNCHER HAS ONE MISSILE AND LOADER-TRANSPORTER






In the hide position waiting for a mission at a detected fire point:
The launch platoon is hiding in the vicinity of a detected fire
point camouflaged and waiting for a fire mission. The platoon
itself is not detected but may become detected (state 14).
14, 15
14
Detected in hide position waiting for mission: The platoon is
hiding near a detected fire point camouflaged and waiting for a
fire mission but has also become detected.
15.93
15
On a detected fire point with a fire mission laying: The platoon
has a fire mission and is on a detected fire point laying the mis-
sile. The platoon may might shoot {state 19), misfire (state 18),




Laid awaiting fire command on a detected point: Launch
platoon is on a detected fire point with firing procedures com-
pleted but has been given the order to fire "At My Command".
The platoon may be ordered to abort the mission (state 17)




Abort present mission and go to an undetected point: The
platoon, which is ready to fire and waiting for the command to
fire, has been ordered to abort the present fire mission and move
to an undetected fire point to avoid enemy attack.
2, 5, 93
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Misfire on a detected point:. The platoon attempted to fire but
received a NO-GO. They conduct misfire procedures, check out
the missile and again attempt ot fire the missile. If the missile
fires the platoon transitions to state 19. If the missile is defective
the platoon may transload another missile onto the launcher at
the point (state 21). The platoon may also travel to the trans-
load point to receive another missile (state 31) a fire point, or





Missile shot: The platoon fired the missile and now conducts
post fire operations and prepares to transload pn the fire point
(state 20), transload en route to another fire point (states 23, 25,
27. 29), or travel to the transload point( state 31). The ammuni-
tion status has changed. Therefore, after transloading the launch
platoon will begin operating in Level Two states. Because of the







Table 12. LEVEL ONE STATES CONCERNING TRANSLOAD OPERATIONS:







Transloading at a detected fire point (after a mission): After a
fire mission the platoon transloads another round onto the
launcher. Because the platoon has only two rounds, it transi-
tions to states in level two. The platoon will either hide (state




Transloading at a detected fire point after a misfire: After de-
termining that a missile is defective, the platoon transloads an-
other round onto the launcher and remains at the detected fire





Transloading at the same undetected fire point after a misfire:
After a misfire and determination that the missile is defective, the
platoon transloads another round onto the launch while re-
maining at the same undetected fire point to either hide (state
38) or to conduct another fire mission (state 39). If the launch
platoon becomes detected while transloading, the platoon will
be hiding but be detected (state 47) or it conducts the mission





Transloading en route to an undetected fire point without a
mission: After a fire mission or misfire on a detected fire point
the platoon leaves and transloads en route to an undetected fire





Down transloading en route to an undetected fire point without
a mission: A vehicle breaks down while transloading en route. 38. 89
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Transloading en route to an undetected fire point with a mission:
Identical to state 23 except the platoon has a fire mission and




Down transloading en route to an undetected fire point with a




Transloading en route to a detected fire point without a mission:
After a fire mission or misfire on a detected fire point the platoon
leaves and transloads en route to a detected fire point. Because





Table 13. LEVEL ONE STATES CONCERNING TRANSLOAD OPERATIONS:







Down transloading en route to a detected fire point without a
mission: A vehicle breaks down while transloading en route. 46. 89
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Transloading en route to a detected fire point with a mission:
Identical to state 27 except the platoon has a fire mission and




Down transloading en route to a detected fire point with a




En route to the local transload point: The launch platoon must
return to and transload at the local transload point (state 33)




Down en route to local transload point: A vehicle breaks down
while en route to the local transload point.
33,90
33
Transloading at local transload point: Platoon receives a missile
at the local transload point and goes either to an undetected fire







LEVEL TWO STATES CONCERNING UNDETECTED FIRE
POINTS: LAUNCHER HAS ONE MISSILE AND






En route to new fire point without a fire mission: The platoon
travels fi-om the batterv' position to a fire point and goes to a




Down en route to new fire point without a fire mission: A ve-
hicle has broken down and stops the platoon fi-om traveling until
it is repaired or replaced. The platoon still has no mission.
38, 92
36
En route to new fire point with a fire mission: This is same as
State 34 except in this state the launch platoon has received a fire




Down en route to new fire point with a mission: Same as State
35 except the platoon has received a fire mission. If the mission
is aborted because of the break down the platoon will go to a




In hide position at an undetected fire point: The platoon is near
an undetected fire point, camouflaged and waiting for a fire
mission. When the mission comes the platoon goes to the fire
point (state 39). If the platoon becomes detected while waiting
it transitions to state 14.
39.47
39
On new fire point with a mission laying: The platoon has a fire
mission and is on an undetected fire point laying the missile. The
platoon may receive orders to fire "At My Command" (state 40).





On new fire point laid awaiting fire command: The platoon is
on an undetected fire point with all firing procedures completed
but has been given the order to fire "At My Command." When
the command to fire is received the platoon fires (state 52) or
misfires (state 41). There is a probabihty that the platoon be-




Table 15. LEVEL TWO STATES CONCERNING UNDETECTED FIRE
POINTS: LAUNCHER HAS ONE MISSILE AND






Misfire on an unused fire point: The platoon attempted to fire
the missile but received a NO-GO in launch procedures. The
platoon conducts misfire procedures, checks out the missile and
again attempts to fire the missile. If the missile fires then the
platoon transitions to state 52. If the missile is defective then,
depending upon the tactical configuration, the platoon either
transloads another missile onto the launcher at the fire point




Table 16. LEVEL TWO STATES CONCERNING DETECTED FIRE POINTS:







En route to detected fire point without a fire mission: The
launch platoon is en route from the battery position to a fire
point which is assumed to be detected by the enemy. Because it




Down en route to a detected fire point without a fire mission:




En route to detected fu-e point with a mission: This is same as
State 42 except the platoon has received a fire mission and goes




Down en route to a detected fire point with a mission: This is
same as State 43 except the platoon has received a fire mission.
If the fire mission is aborted because of the breakdown, the




Table 17. LEVEL TVVO STATES CONCERNING DETECTED FIRE POINTS:
LAUNCHER HAS ONE MISSILE AND LOADER-TRANSPORTER






In the hide position waiting for a mission at a detected fire point:
The launch platoon is hiding in the vicinity of a detected fire
point camouflaged and waiting for a fire mission. The platoon
itself is not detected but may become detected (state 47).
47,48
47
Detected in hide position waiting for mission: The platoon is
hiding near a detected fire point camouflaged and waiting for a
fire mission but has also become detected.
48,93
48
On a detected fire point with a fire mission laying: The platoon
has a fire mission and is on a detected fire point laying the mis-
sile. The platoon may might shoot (state 52), misfire (state 51),




Laid awaiting fire command on a detected point: Launch
platoon is on a detected fire point with firing procedures com-
pleted but has been given the order to fire "At My Command".
The platoon may be ordered to abort the mission (state 50)




Abort present mission and go to an undetected point: The
platoon, which is ready to fire and waiting for the command to
fire, has been ordered to abort the present fire mission and move




Misfire on a detected point:. The platoon attempted to fire but
received a NO-GO. They conduct misfire procedures, check out
the missile and again attempt ot fire the missile. If the missile
fires the platoon transitions to state 52. If the missile is defective
the platoon may transload another missile onto the launcher at
the point (state 54). The platoon may also travel to the trans-
load point to receive another missile (state 64) a fire point, or





Missile shot: The platoon fired the missile and now conducts
post fire operations and prepares to transload on the fire point
(state 53), transload en route to another fire point (states 56, 58,
60, 63), or travel to the transload point(state 64). The ammuni-
tion status has changed. Therefore, after transloading the launch
platoon will begin operating in Level Three states. Because of







Table 18. LEVEL TWO STATES CONCERNING TRANSLOAD OPER-
ATIONS: LAUNCHER HAS ONE MISSILE AND






Transloading at a detected fire point (after a mission): After a
fire niission the platoon transloads another round onto the
launcher. Because the platoon has only two rounds, it transi-
tions to states in level two. The platoon '^'ill either hide (state




Transloading at a detected fire point after a misfire: After de-
termining that a missile is defective, the platoon transloads an-
other round onto the launcher and remains at the detected fire





Transloading at the same undetected fire point afi;er a misfire:
After a misfire and determination that the missile is defective, the
platoon transloads another round onto the launch while re-
maining at the same undetected fire point to either hide (state
71) or to conduct another fire mission (state 72). If the launch
platoon becomes detected while transloading, the platoon will
be hiding but be detected (state 80) or it conducts the mission





Transloading en route to an undetected fire point without a
mission: After a fire mission or misfire on a detected fire point
the platoon leaves and transloads en route to an undetected fire





Down transloading en route to new fire point without a mission:
A vehicle breaks down while transloading en route. 71, 89
58
Transloading en route to new fire point with a mission: Identical
to state 56 except the platoon has a fire mission and will go to
the fire point (state 72).
59, 72,
89
59 Down transloading en route to new point with a mission: Iden-
tical to state 57 except the platoon has a fire mission.
72,89
60
Transloading en route to a detected fire point without a mission:
After a fire mission or misfire on a detected fire point the platoon
leaves and transloads en route to a detected fu-e point. Because





Table 19. LEVEL TWO STATES CONCERNING TRANSLOAD OPER-
ATIONS: LAUNCHER HAS ONE MISSILE AND






Down transloading en route to a detected fire point without a
mission: A vehicle breaks down while transloading en route. 79, 89
62
Transloading en route to a detected fire point with a mission:
Identical to state 60 except the platoon has a fire mission and




Down transloading en route to a detected fire point with a




En route to the local transload point: The launch platoon must
return to and transload at the local transload point (state 66)




Down en route to local transload point: A vehicle breaks down
while en route to the local transload point.
66, 90
66
Transloading at local transload point: Platoon receives a missile
at the local transload point and goes either to an undetected fire







LEVEL THREE STATES CONCERNING UNDETECTED FIRE







En route to new fire point without a fire mission: The platoon
travels fi-om the batter>" position to a fire point and goes to a




Down en route to new fire point without a fire mission: A ve-
hicle has broken down and stops the platoon from traveling until
it is repaired or replaced. The platoon still has no mission.
71,92
69
En route to new fire point with a fire mission: This is same as
State 67 except in this state the launch platoon has received a fire




Down en route to new fire point with a mission: Same as State
69 except the platoon has received a fire mission. If the mission
is aborted because of the break down the platoon will go to a




In hide position at an undetected fire point: The platoon is near
an undetected fire point, camouflaged and waiting for a fire
mission. When the mission comes the platoon goes to the fire
point (state 72). If the platoon becomes detected while waiting
it transitions to state 14.
72, 80
72
On new fire point with a mission laying: The platoon has a fire
mission and is on an undetected fire point laying the missile. The
platoon may receive orders to fire "At My Command" (state 73).





On new fire point laid awaiting fire command: The platoon is
on an undetected fire point with all firing procedures completed
but has been given the order to fire "At My Command." When
the command to fire is received the platoon fires (state 85) or
misfires (state 74). There is a probability that the platoon be-




Table 21. LEVEL THREE STATES CONCERNING UNDETECTED FIRE







.Vlisfire on an unused fire point: The platoon attempted to fire
the missile but received a NO-GO in launch procedures. The
platoon conducts misfire procedures, checks out the missile and
again attempts to fire the missile. If the missile fires then the
platoon transitions to state 85. If the missile is defective, then
the platoon travels to the transload point to receive another
missile (state 86).
85, 86
Table 22. LEVEL THREE STATES CONCERNING DETECTED FIRE







En route to detected fire point without a fire mission: The
launch platoon is en route from the batter>' position to a fire
point which is assumed to be detected by the enemy. Because it




Down en route to a detected fire point without a fire mission:




En route to detected fire point with a mission: This is same as
State 75 except the platoon has received a fire mission and goes




Down en route to a detected fire point with a mission: This is
same as State 76 except the platoon has received a fire mission.
If the fire mission is aborted because of the breakdown, the




Table 23. LEVEL THREE STATES CONCERNING DETECTED FIRE
POINTS: LAUNCHER HAS ONE MISSILE AND






In the hide position waiting for a mission at a detected fire point:
The launch platoon is hiding in the vicinity of a detected fire
point camouflaged and waiting for a fire mission. The platoon
itself is not detected but may become detected (state 80).
80, 81
80
Detected in hide position waiting for mission: The platoon is
hiding near a detected fire point camouflaged and waiting for a
fire mission but has also become detected.
81,93
81
On a detected fire point with a fire mission laying: The platoon
has a fire mission and is on a detected fire point laying the mis-
sile. The platoon may might shoot (state 85), misfire (state 84),




Laid awaiting fire command on a detected point: Launch
platoon is on a detected fire point with firing procedures com-
pleted but has been given the order to fire "At My Command".
The platoon may be ordered to abort the mission (slate 83)




Abort present mission and go to an undetected point: The
platoon, which is ready to fire and waiting for the command to
fire, has been ordered to abort the present fire mission and move




Misfire on a detected point:. The platoon attempted to fire but
received a NO-GO. They conduct misfire procedures, check out
the missile and again attempt ot fire the missile. If the missile
fires the platoon transitions to state 85. If the missile is defective





Vlissile shot: The platoon fired the missile and now conducts
post fire operations and prepares to displace. The platoon now




Table 24. LEVEL THREE STATES CONCERNING TRANSLOAD OPER-







En route to the Battery Area: The launch platoon must return
to the batter\- area to receive more missiles. Upon arrival the
platoon will receive missiles (state 88).
87, 88,
90
87 Down en route to battery area: A vehicle breaks down while en
route to the Batter\" area.
88,90
88
Transloading at Batterv' Area. Launch platoon receives a missile
on the launcher and the accopanying Loader-Transporter, if in
tactical configuration one or two, receives two missiles. If the
platoon is in tactical configuration one or two, the platoon will
travel to a fire point and transition to states in first level of ac-
tivity (states 1. 3, 9, 11). If the platoon is in tactical configura-
tion three the platoon will travel to a fire point and transition to













Destroyed while transloading en route. The platoon has been
attacked while transloading en route and is destroyed, captured
or out of action.
89
90
Destroyed en route to Transload point. Platoon is attacked
while traveling to a local transload point or the battery position
point and destroyed, captured or out of action for the the battle.
90
91
Destroyed at Transload point. Platoon is attacked while trans-
loading at the local transload point or battery position and is
destroyed, captured or out of action for the battle.
91
92
Destroyed en route to Fire Point.The platoon is attacked while




Destroyed at Fire Point or hide position. The launch platoon
has been attacked while hiding or operating at a fire point and




Table 26. PROGVAR INPUT
IN-
PUT INPUT DESCRIPTION VALUE
1
PROBABILITY BEING DESTROYED WHILE EN ROLTE
TO A FIRE POINT FROM THE TRANSLOAD POINT 0.025
2
PROBABILITY OF VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE EN




PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED DURING BREAK




PROBABILITY OF A MISSION BEING ABORTED DUE TO
A VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE EN ROUTE TO A




PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED WHILE IN HIDE
POSITION AT AN UNDETECTED FIRE POINT BEFORE A
FIRE MISSION IS RECEIVED.
0.05
6
PROBABILITY OF BEING GIVEN FIRE AT MY COM-
MAND' VS WHEN READY' WHEN FIRING A MISSION
FROM AN UNDETECTED FIRE POINT
0.5
7
PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED WHEN THE
LAUNCH PLATOON HAS LAID THE MISSILE BUT IS
WAITING FOR THE COMMAND TO FIRE
0.1
9
PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED IN THE HIDE POSI-




PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED IN A DETECTED




PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE LAYING
THE MISSILE ON A DETECTED FIRE POINT. 0.05
12
PROBABILITY OF BEING GIVEN FIRE AT MY COM-
MAND VS WHEN READY' WHEN FIRING A MISSION
FROM A DETECTED FIRE POINT
0.2
47
Table 27. PROGVAR INPUT (CONTINUED)
IN-
PUT INPUT DESCRIPTION VALUE
13
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE AWAIT-
ING COMMAND TO FIRE WHEN FIRING A MISSION
FROM A DETECTED FIRE POINT
0.05
14
PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING COMMAND TO FIRE
VERSES ABORT MISSION BEFORE BEING DESTROYED
WHEN FIRING FROM A DETECTED FIRE POINT
0.05
15
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE EN-
ROLTE TO A NEW POINT AFTER ABORTING A MISSION
AT A DETECTED FIRE POINT.
0.02
16
PROBABILITY OF VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE
ENROUTE FROM ONE FIRE POINT TO ANOTHER. 0.03
17
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED BEFORE TAKING
ACTION TO REPLACE DEFECTIVE ROUND AFTER MIS-
FIRE AT AN UNDETECTED FIRE POINT.
O.Ol
18
PROBABILITY OF TR.\NSLOADING A DEFECTIVE
ROUND AFTER MISFIRE AT A DETECTED POINT AND
REMAINING AT THE POINT FOR THE NEXT MISSION
VERSES TIUANSLOADING THE ROUND WHILE EN
ROUTE TO ANOTHER FIRE POINT.
0.1
20
PROBABILITY OF ABORTING MISSION BECAUSE OF
DEFECTIVE MISSILE ON A DETECTED FIRE POINT (DO




PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE RECOV-




PROBABILITY TRANSLOADING AND FIRING AGAIN AT
THE SAME FIRE POINT VERSES TRANSLOADING EN
ROUTE TO ANOTHER POINT.
0.1
24 PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A MISSION WHILETRANSLOADING ENROUTE TO A FIRE POINT 0.5
25
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANS-
LOADING AT THE FIRE POINT AFTER A FIRE MISSION 0.15
26
PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A MISSION WHILE




Table 28. PROGVAR INPUT (CONTINUED)
IN-
PUT INPUT DESCRIPTION VALUE
27
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANS-
LOADING AT DETECTED POINT AFTER A MISFIRE 0.09
28
PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOADING AT THE SAME DE-
TECTED FIRE POINT AFTER A MISFIRE AND CONTIN-
UING THE FIRE MISSION VERSES TRANSLOADING AT
THE POINT, ABORTING THE MISSION AND GOING TO
THE HIDE POSITION FOR THAT FIRE POINT.
0.3
29
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANS-




PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED WHILE TRANS-
LOADING AT A NEW FIRE POINT AFTER A MISFIRE 0.1
31
PROBABILITY OF ABORTING MISSION BECAUSE OF A
MISFIRE ON A NEW POINT AND MOVING TO THE HIDE
POSITION AT THAT POINT
0.2
32
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE TR.ANS-
LOADING EN ROUTE FROM A DETECTED FIRE POINT
TO A NEW OR UNDETECTED FIRE POINT.
0.04
34
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE BROKEN




PROBABILITY OF DESTRUCTION WHILE TRANSLOAD-
ING EN ROUTE TO A DETECTED FIRE POINT. 0.04
37
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE BROKEN




PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE EN




PROBABILITY OF VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE EN
ROUTE TO THE LOCAL TRANSLOAD POINT 0.09
40
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE BROKEN




PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE AT LOCAL
TR.ANSLOAD POINT 0.05
49
Table 29. PROGVAR INPUT (CONTINUED)
IN-
PUT INPUT DESCRIPTION VALUE
42
PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A FIRE MISSION PRIOR
TO ARRIVING AT THE FIRE POINT AFTER




PROBABILITY MISSILES ARE ALREADY SUPPLIED AT
BATTERY VERSES REQUIRING THE LAUNCH PLATOON
TO WAIT FOR MISSILES TO ARRIVE.
0.8
45
PROBABILITY OF A MISFIRE ON FIRST ATTEMPT TO
FIRE A MISSILE 0.1
46
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFULLY FIRING THE MISSILE




PROBABILITY THAT A FIRING POINT IS UNUSED AND
UNDETECTED VERSES USED (FIRED FROM, ASSUMED
TO BE DETECTED) ENTER CONFIGUR.\TION (1. 2 OR 3)
0.9
50
PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE EN




PROBABILITY OF VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE EN




PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE BROKEN








Table 30. PROGTIME INPUTS
IN-
PUT INPUT DESCRIPTION VALUE
1
TR^^VEL TIME BETWEEN LOCAL TR^^NSLOAD POINT TO
A FIRE POINT 20
2
TRAVEL TIME FROM BATTERY POSITION TO A FIRE
POINT 40
3
EXPECTED TIME NEEDED TO RECOVER WHEN DOWN
FOR MAINTENANCE EN ROUTE 60
4
TIME WAITING IN HIDE POSITION UNTIL MISSION RE-
CEIVED 60
5
TIME TO TRAVEL FROM HIDE POSITION TO THE FIRE
POINT AND LAY WEAPON 30
6
TIME UNTIL RECEIVING COMMAND TO FIRE WHEN
LAID AND WAITING 30
7
TIME NEEDED TO CONDUCT MISFIRE PROCEDURES
AND FIRE AGAIN 30
8
TIME NEEDED TO CONDUCT MISFIRE PROCEDURES
AND REJECT BAD ROUND 20
9
TIME UNTIL RECEIVING COMMAND TO ABORT
MISSION WHEN LAID AND DETECTED 40
10 TLME TO DISPLACE WHEN ABORTING MISSION 15
51
Table 31. PROGTIME INPUTS (CONTINUED)
IN-
PUT INPUT DESCRIPTION VALUE
11 TIME TO DISPLACE AFTER ROUND IS FIRED 15
12
TIME NEEDED TO TRANSLOAD AT A FIRE POINT AF-
TER A MISSION IS SHOT 20
13
TIME NEEDED TO TRANSLOAD AT A FIRE POINT AF-
TER A MISFIRE (CON 1) 30
14
TIME NEEDED TO TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE AND
TRAVEL TO NEXT POINT (CON 1) 50
15
EXPECTED TIME TO TRANSLOAD AT TR.ANSLOAD
POINT OR BATTERY POSITION 30
17
TIME UNTIL BECOMING DETECTED WHILE IN HIDE
POSITION (UNDETECTED POINT) 120
18
TIME UNTIL BECOMING DETECTED WHILE IN HIDE
POSITION(DETECTED POINT) 80
19
ADDITIONAL TIME IN DETECTED HIDE POSITION BE-
FORE MISSION RECEIVED 30
20
TIME UNTIL BECOMING DETECTED WHILE LAID






[I] f\THIS PROGRAM ASKS THE PROGRAMMER TO ENTER A SERIES OF PROBABILITIES
C2] F^WHICH ARE USED IN THE PROGRAMS PROGIMTX , PR0G2MTX AND PR0G3MTX TO
[3] ftCREATE THE 93 BY 93 TRANSITION MATRIX iPIJM)
[U] PiFIRST CREATE A VECTOR iVAR) TO STORE THE INPUT VARIABLES
[5] VAR-irSSpO
C6] PiNOW THE PROGRAMMER ENTERS THE INITIAL CONFIGURATION
C73 F^THE PROGRAMMER DOES NO RUN THIS ENTIRE PROGRAM IN ORDER TO CHANGE
[8] P THE CONFIGURATION BUT CAN USE PROGRAM 'CON^
[9] ' »






[16] LOOPl: ^CONFIGURATION 2
[17] ^(VARlU9l7t2)pL00P2
[18] VARUS, 19, 23)2-^0
[19] VARL^Sl^l
[20] -^LOOPS
[21] L00P2: ^^CONFIGURATION 3
[22] 7y^i?[(8,19,23,48)]-«-0
[23] « '
[24] LC0P3: rTVOA^ the PROGRAM PROMPTS THE USER FOR INPUT DATA
[2 5] 'ENTER THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURANCE OF THE FOLLOWING SITIUATIONS , ^
[26] ' '
[27] 'EACH PROBABILITY MUST BE REPRESENTED AS A DECIMAL BETWEEN AND 1.0
[28] ' '
[2 9] '1. PROBABILITY BEING DESTROYED WHILE EN ROUTE TO A FIRE POINT FROM^
[3 0] 'THE TRANSLOAD POINT'
53
[31] VARlll-^U
[3 2] '2. PROBABILITY OF VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE EN ROUTE TO^
[33] 'A FIRE POINT FROM THE TRANSLOAD POINT'
[34] VARL21<-U
[3 5] '3. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED DURING BREAK DOWN WHILE ENROUT.
[3 6] 'TO A FIRE POINT FROM THE TRANSLOAD POINT'
[37] VAR131*-U
[3 8] 'U. PROBABILITY OF A MISSION BEING ABORTED DUE TO A VEHICULAR'
[3 9] 'BREAK DOWN WHILE EN ROUTE TO A FIRE POINT FROM THE TRANSOAD POim
[40] 'OR BATTERY POSITION'
[41] VARim^rU
[4 2] '5. PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED WHILE IN HIDE POSITION AT AN UNI
[43] 'FIRE POINT BEFORE A FIRE MISSION IS RECEIVED.'
[44] VARISI-^U
[4 5] '6. PROBABILITY OF BEING GIVEN FIRE AT "MY COMMAND" VS "WHEN'
[46] 'READY" WHEN FIRING A MISSION FROM AN UNUSED FIRE POINT'
[47] VARLei^U
[48] '7. PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED WHEN THE LAUNCH PLATOON HAS LAIl
[4 9] 'THE MISSILE BUT IS WAITING FOR THE COMMAND TO FIRE'
[50] vARn:i^u
[51] '9. PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED IN THE HIDE POSITION AT A DETECl
[52] 'FIRE POINT BEFORE RECEIVING A MISSION.'
[53] VAR191^U
[54] '10. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED IN A DETECTED HIDE POSITION'
[5 5] 'AT A DETECTED FIRE POINT BEFORE RECEIVING A MISSION.'
[56] VARLIOI-^U
[57] '11. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE LAYING THE MISSILE ON A'
[58] ' DETECTED FIRE POINT .
'
[59] VARLlll-^Q
[6 0] '12. PROBABILITY OF BEING GIVEN FIRE "AT MY COMMAND'' VS "WHEN '
[61] 'READY" WHEN FIRING A MISSION FROM A DETECTED FIRE POINT'
[62] VAR1121^D
[6 3] '13. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE AWAITING COMMAND TO FIRE
[6 4] 'WHEN FIRING A MISSION FROM DETECTED FIRE POINT'
54
VARLl3l<rU
'14. PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING COMMAND TO FIRE VERSES ABORT MISSION^
'BEFORE BEING DESTROYED WHEN FIRING FROM A DETECTED FIRE POINT*
VARLl^l<rU
'15. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE ENROUTE TO A NEW POINT*
* AFTER ABORTING A MISSION AT A DETECTED FIRE POINT,*
VARLlSl-f-U
'16. PROBABILITY OF VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE ENROUTE FROM ONE*




'17. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED BEFORE TAKING ACTION TO*
* REPLACE DEFECTIVE ROUND AFTER MISFIRE AT AN UNDETECTED FIRE POINT,*
VARLl7l<rU
'18. PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOADING A DEFECTIVE ROUND AFTER MISFIRE AT*
*A DETECTED POINT VERSES TRANSLOADING THE ROUND WHILE ENROUTE TO*
* ANOTHER FIRE POINT,*
'
VARLISI^U
'20. PROBABILITY OF ABORTING MISSION BECAUSE OF DEFECTIVE MISSILE AT*
*A DETECTED FIRE POINT {DO NOT TRANSLOAD AND CONTINUE WITH MISSION)*
VAR[.20:\^U
'21. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE RECOVERING OR DISPLACING*
'AFTER A SUCCESSFUL FIRE MISSION*
VARL2i:\^U
'22. PROBABILITY TRANSLOADING AND FIRING AGAIN AT THE SAME FIRE POINT
* VERSES TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO ANOTHER POINT,*
VARL22l^n
*2n, PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A MISSION WHILE TRANSLOADING ENROUTE*
*T0 A FIRE POINT*
VARL2nl^U
'25. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANSLOADING AT THE FIRE*
'POINT AFTER A FIRE MISSION*
VARL252^U
•26. PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A MISSION WHILE TRANSLOADING AT THE*




































'27. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANSLOADING AT A DETE
*FIRE POINT AFTER A MISFIRE'
VARl27l'(rU
'28. PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOADING AND AT THE SAME DETECTED FIRE B
'AFTER A MISFIRE AND CONTINUING THE FIRE MISSION'
'VERSES TRANSLOADING AT THE POINT, ABORTING THE MISSION AND COIN
'THE HIDE POSITION FOR THAT FIRE POINT.'
VARL282^U
'29. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANSLOADING AT AN'
'UNDETECTED FIRE POINT AFTER A MISFIRE'
VARLl^l-f-U
'30, PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED WHILE TRANSLOADING AT A NEW F.
'POINT AFTER A MISFIRE'
VARL301^U
'31. PROBABILITY OF ABORTING MISSION BECAUSE OF A MISFIRE ON A N
'POINT AND MOVING TO THE HIDE POSITION AT THAT POINT'
VARL312^U
'32. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE
'A DETECTED FIRE POINT TO A NEW OR UNDETECTED FIRE POINT.'
VARl322^n
'34. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE BROKEN DOWN, TRANSLOAD.
'EN ROUTE TO A NEW FIRE POINT'
VARLSnl-^D
•35. PROBABILITY OF DESTRUCTION WHILE TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO A
'DETECTED FIRE POINT,'
VAR1351^U
'37. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE BROKEN DOWN, TRANSLOAD
'EN ROUTE TO A USED FIRE POINT'
VARl37l<rU
'38. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE EN ROUTE FROM A FIRE Pi
'TO THE LOCAL TRANSLOAD POINT'
VARl38l'^n
'39. PROBABILITY OF VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE EN ROUTE'
56
TO THE LOCAL TRANSLOAD POINT'
VARL3Q1^U
•40. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE BROKEN DOWN WHILE ENROUTE^
'TO THE LOCAL TRANSLOAD POINT'
VARmol^U
•Ul. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE AT LOCAL TRANSLOAD POINT*
VARimi-frU
'42. PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A FIRE MISSION PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT*
'THE FIRE POINT AFTER TRANSLOADINGiBATTERY OR LOCAL TRANSLOAD POINT)
VARL^ll'frU
'45. PROBABILITY OF A MISFIRE ON FIRST ATTEMPT TO FIRE A MISSILE *
M/?C45]-^D
'46. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFULLY FIRING THE MISSILE WHICH FORMERLY*




'47. PROBABILITY THAT A FIRING POINT IS UNUSED AND UNDETECTED VERSES
'USED (FIRED FROM , ASSUMED TO BE DETECTED)'
VARln7l^n
'50. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE EN ROUTE BETWEEN A FIRE*
'POINT AND THE BATTERY AREA FOR TRANSLOAD OPERATIONS'
VARLSOl^U
'51. PROBABILITY OF VEHICULAR BREAK DOWN WHILE EN ROUTE'
'TO BATTERY AREA FOR TRANSLOAD OPERATIONS'
VARL511<rU
'52. PROBABILITY OF BEING DESTROYED WHILE BROKEN DOWN WHILE ENROUTE*
'TO BATTERY AREA FOR TRANSLOAD OPERATIONS'
VAR\:52l<-U









[I] f^THIS FUNCTION USES THE VECTOR OF INPUT PROBABILITIES FROM VECTOR
[2] pro CREATE THE FIRST LEVEL OF THE P(I,J) MATRIX.
[3] ' •
Zm nFIRST A 93 BY 93 MATRIX OF ZEROS IS CREATED
[53 PIJM^ 93 93 pO
C6] ' •
[7] f^NEXT THE VALUES FOR VALUES OF 'P' ARE COMPUTED AND INPUT INTO THE
LSI ^MATRIX PIJM, EACH STATE 'I' IS LISTED WITH THE STATES 'J' TO WHICh
[9] pjr CAN TRANSITION TO, SIMILAR STATES ARE GROUPED TOGETHER
CIO] »
'
[II] PI MOVING TO AND SHOOTING FROM A POINT ^
[12] Rl ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 2,5 AND 92
[13] r3 ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH A MISSION U,6 AND 92
[lU] p9 ENROUTE TO DETECTED FIRE POINT 10,13 AND 92
[15] Rll ENROUTE TO DETECTED FIRE POINT WITH A MISSION 12,15 AND 92




[20] PIJMLll ; 12l^VARL2lx (l-VARLll )
[21] PiTHE PROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT FIRE POINT WITHOUT INCIDENT
[22] PIJMLl;5l^il-VARL21 )x(l-VARLll )
[23] PIJML3 ',61^il -VAR 122 )x(l-7Ai?[l] )
[21+] PIJML9;132'(r(i-VARL22 )x(i-VARLll )
[25] PIJMLllil52^il-VARL2l )x(l-7Ai?[l] )
[26] r2 DOWN ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 5 AND 92
[27] RH DOWN ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 5,6 AND 92
[28] PlO DOWN ENROUT TO USED FIRE POINT 13 AND 92




PIJML12 ilSlfrVARL^lx (1-VARL31 )





r5 JiV HIDE POSITION AT NEW POINT WAITING FOR MISSION 6,1^
PIJML5iinl-(rVARL51
^PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION BEFORE BEING DETECTED
PIJMl5;61fril-VARL5l )
p6 CiV NEW POINT WITH MISSION LAYING 7,8,19
PIJML6 ;72<r(l-VARLn5l )xVARL6l
PUMLSiSl^VARLnsl
^^PROBABILITY OF FIRING WHEN READY (AND MISSILE FIRES)'
PIJML6;l<5l<-{l-VARm5l )x (l-7.^i?C6] )
p7 new point laid WAITING FIRE COMMAND 8,16,19
PIJML7;8:\'^VARLn51
PIJM17 iiei-^il-VARl^bl )>iVARL7l
(^PROBABILITY OF SHOOTING WHEN COMMANDED BEFORE DETECTION'
PIJM17 il92<r(i-VARL^51 )x(l-7Ai?[7] )
ESTATE 8 MISFIRE ON NEW POINT 19,22,31
PIJM18 1 19l^VARm6l
PIJM\:8;222^il-VARm6l )xVARl8l
^^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO TRANSLOAD POINT TO GET ANOTHER ROUND'
PJJM[8;31]-«-(l-7i^i?[46] )x{l-VARl81 )
p SHOOTING FROM A USED POINT (ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS'
nl3 IN HIDE POSITION AT USED POINT WAITING FOR MISSION m,15
PIJML13;1H1^VARL91
^PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION
PJc7MCl3;15]-e-(l-7>l/?C9] )
Piin IN HIDE POSITION DETECTED WAITING FOR MISSION 15,93
PIJMlli^;93l<rVARll0l
f\PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION BEFORE BEING DESTROYED IN HIDEiPD)
59
[65] PIJMLm;151^(l-VARllOl)
[66] Pi 5 ON USED (DETECTED) POINT WITH MISSION LAYING 16, 18, 19
j
[67] PIJMLl5i93l^VARllll
[68] PIJMLl5',16l*-il'VARL^5l )x(l-VARLlll )^VARL121
[69] PIJMLl5;18l<rVARLn51xii-VARlli:\ )
[70] ^PROBABILITY OF SHOOTING WHEN READY
[71] PIJMll5il9l*-il-VARLn5l )>i(l-VARllll )x (1-7A/?[12] )
[72] Rl6 ON USED (DETECTED) POINT LAID WAITING COMMAND 17,18,19,5
[73] PIJML16i93J^VARLl3']
[74] PIJMLl6il9l^(l-VARLn51 )y(l-VARLl32 )xVARLim
[75] PIJML16 i ISl^VARlnSly (1-VAR1131 )^VARlim
[76] PIJMLl6il7l<-(l-VARLl3l )x(l-VARLinl )
[7 7] 017 ABORT MISSION GO TO NEW POINT 2,5,9
[78] PIJML17;931<-VARL151
[79] PIJML17 i2l<-VARLiely(l-VARll5l )
[80] ^PROBABILITY OF GETTING TO POINT WITHOUT INCEDENT
[81] PIJML17 ',51^(1-VARL161 )^(1-VARL151 )
[82] Rl8 MISFIRE ON USED (DETECTED) POINT 19,21,23,25,27,29,31,^
[83] qROUND fires ON SUBSEQUENT TRY
[84] PJe7WCl8;19]-«-yi^^[U6]
[85] PIJMLl8i93l^(l-VARLn6l )xFAi?[l7]
[86] PJJW[18;21]^(l-7;ii?[46] )x (l-7;ii?[17] )xy^;?[18] xl^^i?[19]
[87] p PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW POINT ABORT MISSION'
[88] PJe7M[18;23]^(l-7yl^[46] )x (l-7^i?[17] )x(l-VARLl8l )xFA/?[19] x7^i?[20]
[8 9] f^PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW POINT SAME MISSION'
[90] PIJMLlSilbl-^d-VARluei )x(l-y^^[17] )x (l-7Ai?[18] )x7.^7?[ig] x (l-y^/?[20]i
[91] ^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO 'TRANSLOAD POINT TO GET ANOTHER ROUND****
[92] PJe7W[18;31]-^(l-7iai?[46] )x (l-7>li?[17] )x (l-7Ai?[l9] )
[93] Pl9 MISSILE SHOT DISPLACING 20,23,25,27,29,31,
[94] PJJM[19;93]^7i4/?[21]
[95] PJc7M[19;20]^(l-7>li?[21] )x7A/?[22]x7;i/?[23] '
[96] P^PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW POSITION'
[97] PJc7M[19;23]-(-(l-7A/?[21] )x (l-7Ai?[22] )x7A/?[23] x (l-7Ai?[24] )x7Ai?t47]
[98] ^^PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO USED POSITION'
60
PIJML19;27l<r(i-VARl211 )x(i-VARL22l )xVARL23lxil-VARl2^1 )x(i-VARLn72 )
p PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW POSITION WITH MISSION^
PJJ«[19;25]-^(l-7/l/?[21] )x(i-VARL22l )xVARL231i<VARL2nl^VARm7l
(^PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO USED POSITION WITH MISSION^
PIJMLl9i29l'i-(l-VARL211 )x(l-Mi?C22] )xVARl23lxVARl2nlx(l-VARZn7l )
PiPROBABILITY OF GOING TO TRANSLOAD POINT TO GET ANOTHER ROUND*
PIe7MCl9;31]'f-(l-7yl/?[21] )x (l-7Jli?C23] )




(^PROBABILITY GOING TO A HIDE POSITION TO AWAIT MISSION
PIJML20i^7l^(l-VARL25l )x(l'VARL26l )
p21 TRANSLOAD AT USED FIRE POINT AFTER MISFIRE 46,4 8,93
PIJMl21i93l<rVARL27l
PIJML21iU8l^(l-VARL271 )yVARZ28l
(^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO HIDE POSITION WITHOUT'
PIJMl21in6l'(-il-VARL27l )y (.1-VARL281 )
22 TRANSLOAD AT SAME FIRE POINT AFTER MISFIRE 38,39,47,48.93
FIJM[22;93]-«-yi^/?[2 9]
(^PROBABILITY OF ABORTING THEN HIDE POSITION WITHOUT BEING DETECTED*
PIJML22',381^(1-VARL291 )y(l-VARL30l )xVARl311
f^PROB OF CONTINUING MISSION AT POINT AFTER TRANSLOAD UNDETECTED*
PIJML22',39l'(rU-VARL29l )x (l-7Ai?C30] )>^il-VARL311 )
(^PROB OF ABORTING THEN HIDE POSITION BECOMING DETECTED*
PIJML22iK71'(r(i-VARL29l )xVARL30lyVARL311
f^PROB OF CONTINUING MISSION AT POINT AFTER TRANSLOAD DETECTED*
PIJML22;^Sl'(rii-VARL29l )xVARL30lx(i-VARL311 )
r23 TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 3 8,24,94
r25 TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 3 9,26,94
PIJMl (23 ,25); 89l'<rVARL32l
PIJML23 ;2^:\'<rVARL161x (1-VAR1321 )
PIJMZ25;26l^VARLl6lxil-VARl32l
)
PiPROBABILITY OF GOING TO NEW POINT OR HIDE POSITION
PIJM123 ;38l'fr(i-VARLie:\ )xii-VARL32l )
61
[133] PIJML25t39l<r(i-VARLl6l )^il-VARL32l )
[13 4] p24 down TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 38,9
[13 5] p26 DOWN TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 3 9,9
[136] FJt7M[ (24, 26 );89]-«-7A/?[34]
[13 7] ^PROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT NEW POINT
[138] FJe7M[24;38]*-(l-7Ai?[34] )
[139] PJc7M[26;39]-*-(l-7i^/?[34] )
[140] r27 TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT 46,28,9
[141] p29 TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT 48,30,9
[142] PJJW[ (27, 29 );89]-«-yAi?[35]
[143] PJc7M[27;28]-«-(l-7>l^[35] )x7i^i?[16]
[144] PIe7M[29;30]-e-(l-yi^/?[3 5] )x7;i/?[16]
[14 5] ^^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO USED POINT OR HIDE POSITIONAT USED POINT
[146] PJJM[27;46]-f-(l-7Ai?[35] )x (l-y^/?[16] )
[147] PJe7MC29;48]-e-(l-7i^/?[35] )x (l-7i^^[16] )
[148] R28 DOWN TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT 46,9
[14 9] P30 DOWN TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT W/MISSION 48,9
[150] PIJMLi28»30);89l^VAR\:37l
[151] (^PROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT NEW POINT'
[152] PJc7M[28;46]-«-(l-7i^i?[37] )
[153] PIe7M[30;48]-«-(l-Fili?[37] )
[154] R31 ENROUTE TO TRANSLOAD POINT 32,33,9
[155] PJJM[31;90]-«-7iqi?[38]
[156] PJe7M[31;32]-«-FA/?[39]x(l-7i^^[38] )
[157] (^PROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT POINT WITHOUT INCIDENT
[158] PJe7W[31;33]-«-(l-7Aff[39] )x (l-7i4/?[38] )
[159] p32 down while ENROUTE TO TRANSLOAD POINT 3 3,9
[160] PJJW[32;90]-eFAi?[40]
[161] PiPROBABILBITY OF ARRIVING AT TRANSLOAD POINT
[162] PJJM[32;33]-^(l-7i^;?[40] )
[163] p33 TRANSLOADING AT TRANSLOAD POINT 34,36,42,44,9
[164] PJe7W[33;91]-«-7^i?[41]
[16 5] (^PROBABILITY GOING TO A NEW POINT WITHOUT A MISSION'
[166] PIJMl33i3m^il-VARmil )x (l-V;i/?[42] )xM/?[47]
62
[16 7] qPROBABILTY OF GOING TO A NEW POINT WITH A MISSION
[168] PIJML33;36l^(l-VARlnil )xVARLn2l>iVARLn7l
[16 9] f\PROBABILITY OF GOING TO A USED POINT WITHOUT A MISSION
[170] PIJML33i^2l<rii-VARmil )x(i-VARL^21 )x(l-VARl^72 )





[I] f^THIS FUNCTION USES A SERIES OF PROBABILITY VALUES FROM VECTOR iVAR
[2] ftTO CREATE THE SECOND LEVEL OF THE PiI»J) MATRIX,
[3] ft (SEE EXPLANATION FOR PROGIMTX)
[U] ft MOVING TO AND SHOOTING FROM A POINT
^
[5] ftSH ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 3 5,38 AND 92
[6] p36 ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH A MISSION 3 7,39 AND 92
[7] 42 ENROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT 4 3,H6 AND 92






[14] ftTHE PROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT FIRE POINT WITHOUT INCIDENT
[15] PIJML3ni38l^il-VARl2l )^il-VARLll )
[16] PIJML36i392'fr(l-VARL22 )xil-VARLll )
[17] PIJMLU2;U61^(,1-VARL21 )x(l-VARLl2 )
[18] PJc7W[44;48]^(l-7i4i?[2] )x(l-7Ai?[l] )
[19] r3 5 down ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 3 8 AND 9
[2 0] p37 down ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 3 8,39 AND 9
[21] 43 DOWN ENROUT TO USED FIRE POINT 46 AND 3
[22] 04 5 DOWN ENROUT TO USED FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 46,47 AND 9
[2 3] FJ«7W[ (3 5, 3 7, 43, 45 );92]-f-7i5^[3]
[24] PIJM137 ;3Sl^VARimx (1-VARL32 )
[25] PIJML^5in6:\<-VARLmxil'VARL32 )
[26] ftPROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT FIRE POINT AFTER UPiWITH MISSION)
[27] PIJML35;38l^il-VARL31)
[28] PIJML37 ;39l<ril-VAR\:3l )x (l-7>li?[4] )
[29] PJc7W[43;46]-e-(l-7A^[3] )
[30] PIJMZU5iU72^(l-VARL3l )x(l-7Ai?[u] )
64
n3S IN HIDE POSITION AT NEW POINT WAITING FOR MISSION 39,47
PJt7M[38;47]<-7Ai?C5]
^PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION BEFORE BEING DETECTED
PIJMlSSiS^lfril-VARLSl )
p39 OiV NEW POINT WITH MISSION LAYING 40,41,52
PUMLd^i^Ol-frCl-VARLnsi )xVARLel
PIJML39 i^ll-^VARLUbl
^PROBABILITY OF FIRING WHEN READY (AND MISSILE FIRES)'
PIJM139 ; 52l^il-VARm53 )x(i-VARL6l )
PUO NEW POINT LAID WAITING FIRE COMMAND 41,49,52
PIJMLnO im:\'(rVARlU5l
PIJMLno inQl^rd-VARLnSl )^VARL71
^PROBABILITY OF SHOOTING WHEN COMMANDED BEFORE DETECTION'
PIJMLU0',52:\^(.l-VARln5l )x(l-VARl7l )
PiSTATE 41 MISFIRE ON NEW POINT 52,55,64
PIJMimi 521-^7ARlnbl
PJJM[41;55]-«-(l-7A/?[46] )^VAR\.Q'\
^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO TRANSLOAD POINT TO GET ANOTHER ROUND'
PIJMLniiem^il-VARLn6l )x(i-y^i?[8] )
p SHOOTING FROM A USED POINT {ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS'
R46 IN HIDE POSITION AT USED POINT WAITING FOR MISSION 47,48
PJ«7M[46;47]-^7A;?C9]
(^PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION
PJJMC46;48]-«-(l-Fi^i?[9] )
r^^l IN HIDE POSITION DETECTED WAITING FOR MISSION 48,93
PJ.7MC47;93]^7.4i?[10]
^PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION BEFORE BEING DESTROYED IN HIDEiPD)
PI«7MC47;48]-«-(l-7.qPCl0] )
R48 0/V USED (DETECTED) POINT WITH MISSION LAYING 49,51,52,93
PJe7M[48;93]-f-7Ai?Cll]
PJt7M[48;49]-f-(l-yyli?[45] )>i(l-VARllll )>iVARll2l
PIJMLU8 ; 5i:\^VARm5Jx (I'VARLlll )
^PROBABILITY OF SHOOTING WHEN READY
PIJMC48j52]-«-(l-Fi5i?[45] )x(l-VARllll )^(1-VARL122 )
65
[6 5] R49 ON USED (DETECTED ) POINT LAID WAITING COMMAND 50,51,52,93
[66] PIJML^9i93l^VARL13l
[67] PIJMLn9;50l<r(l-VARl^5l )y(l-VARLl3l )xVARLmi
[68] PIJMlng ; bll^VARmbl^ (1-VARL131 )^VARlim
[69] PIJMLng I 521'(-(1-VAR1131 )x (1-7A/?[14] )
[70] r50 abort mission GO TO NEW POINT 35,38,93
[71] PJc7M[50;93]-e-7i^/?[15]
[72] PIJML50i351'frVAR\:i61xil-VARll5:i )
[73] (^PROBABILITY OF GETTING TO POINT WITHOUT INCEDENT
[7H] PJc7M[50;38]-e-(l-7i^i?[16] )x(l-VARLl5l )
[75] R51 MISFIRE ON USED (DETECTED) POINT 52,54,56,58,60,62,64
[76] P^ROUND FIRES ON SUBSEQUENT TRY
[77] PIJML51i52:\^VARLU6l
[78] PIJML51;93l<-il-VARln6l )xVARLl7:\
[79] PJc7W[51;54]-«-(l-74i?[46] )x (1-7A/?[17] )yVARll81xVARLl9l
[80] fi PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW POINT ABORT MISSION'
[81] PUMLbliSei^il-VARluei )x(l-VARLl7l )x (l-y^/?[l8] )xVARll9lxVARl201
[82] f^PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW POINT SAME MISSION'
[83] PIc7M[51;58]<-(l-yiq;?[46] )x (l-FAi?[17] )x (1-7>1P[18] )x7Ai?[19] x (l-l^>li?[20]
[8U] (^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO TRANSLOAD POINT TO GET ANOTHER ROUND
[85] PJJW[51;6H]-^(l-7>l/?[i+6] )x (l-7Ai?[l7] )x (l-7iili?[19] )
[86] R52 MISSILE SHOT DISPLACING 53,56,58,60,62,64,
[87] PIJML52;93l'frVARZ211
[88] PJc7M[52;53]-«-(l-7iqP[21] )xVARL221xVARL23l
[8 9] (^PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW POSITION'
[90] PIJML52i56l<-il-VARL211 )x(l-VARL22l )xVARL232xU-VARL2m )x7>li?[47]
[91] (^PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO USED POSITION'
[92] PJe7M[52;60]-«-(l-7Ai?[21] )xil-VARL22l )xVARL231x(l-VARL2nl )x (l-7Ai?[47]
[93] R PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW POSITION WITH MISSION'
[94] PJJM[52;58]-e-(l-7i5/?[21] )x (l-7Ai?[22] )xFA^[23] x7^/?[24] xy;ii?[i+7]
[9 5] (^PROBABILITY OF TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO USED POSITION WITH MISSION'
[96] PIJM[52;62]^(l-7ili?[21] )x(,l-VARL22l )xyAi?[23] x7/li?[24] x (i-7i^i?[U7] )




p53 TRANSLOAD AT USED FIRE POINT {AFTER MISSION) 80,81,93
PIJML53 ;931^VARL251
PIJML53 iSll-frii-VARLlbl )>cVARL26l
^PROBABILITY GOING TO A HIDE POSITION TO AWAIT MISSION
PIJML53iS0l^il-VARL25l )x(,l-VARL26l )
pSH TRANSLOAD AT USED FIRE POINT AFTER MISFIRE 79,81,93
PIJMZ5ni931<rVARL27l
PJt7W[5i+;81]<-(l-7Ai?[27] )xVARL2Bl
f\PROBABILITY OF GOING TO HIDE POSITION WITHOUT'
PIJM\.Sn\79'\^{l-VAR\.2T\ )x (l-7Ai?[28] )
r55 TRANSLOAD AT SAME FIRE POINT AFTER MISFIRE 71,72,80,81,93
PJJM[55;93]'«-7i^i?[29]
^PROBABILITY OF ABORTING THEN HIDE POSITION WITHOUT BEING DETECTED^
P7JM[55;71]<-(l-7iqi?C29] )^{1-VAR\.3 0:\ )^VAR131'\
^PROB OF CONTINUING MISSION AT POINT AFTER TRANSLOAD UNDETECTED'
PJJM[55;72]^(l-7ili?C29] )x (l-7A/?[30] )x (l-FA/?C31] )
P^PROB OF ABORTING THEN HIDE POSITION BECOMING DETECTED'
PJJW[55;80]-«-(l-7i^/?C29] )^VAR\.3 0:\y.VAR\.3i:\
qPROB of continuing mission at point after TRANSLOAD DETECTED'
PIJM155 ;Bll'(r(l-VARL29l )xVARL30:\xil-VARL311 )
p56 TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 71,57,94
p58 TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 72,59,94
PJJM [( 56, 58 ); 89] -^Fiil/? [3 2]
PIJML56 I 57 l'^VARLl61xil-VARl32l )
PIJML58;59:\^VARLl61x(i-VARL32l )
^^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO NEW POINT OR HIDE POSITION
PIJML56;711^(l-VARll6j )xil-VARL32l )
PIJML58i72l<rii-VARLie2 )xil-VARL321 )
P57 DOWN TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 71,94
R59 DOWN TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 72,94
PJJMC ( 57 , 59 ) ; 89]'«-FAflC34]




[13 3] 060 TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT 79,61,9




[13 8] ^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO USED POINT OR HIDE POSITIONAT USED POINT
[139] PIJM160 ;791^(1-VARL351 )y(l-VARLl6l )
[140] PJJM[62;81]-(-(l-7A/?[35] )x (1-7A/?[16] )
[141] p61 DOWN TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT 79,9
[142] p63 down TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT W/MISSION 81, 9»
[143] PJc7M[(61,63);89]-«-7Ai?[37]
[144] ^PROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT NEW POINT'
[145] PJc7W[61;79]-^(l-7A/?[37] )
[146] PIJMLe3i811^il-VARL37l)




[150] ^PROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT POINT WITHOUT INCIDENT
[151] PIJML6H',88l^(l-VARL39:i )x(l'VARL38'] )
[152] 06 5 DOWN WHILE ENROUTE TO TRANSLOAD POINT 88,9
[153] PIJML65i90:\<rVARl^01
[154] nPROBABILBITY OF ARRIVING AT TRANSLOAD POINT
[155] PJe7M[65;88]-e-(l-7^P[40] )
[156] 066 TRANSLOADING AT TRANSLOAD POINT 67,69,75,77,9
[157] PJe7W[66;91]-^7i^i?[41]
[158] ^PROBABILITY GOING TO A NEW POINT WITHOUT A MISSION'
[159] puMieeieii-frd-vARimi )x(i-7Ai?[42] )yVARm7i
[16 0] ftPROBABILTY OF GOING TO A NEW POINT WITH A MISSION
[161] PIJML66i69l^(l-VARim:i )x7>li?[42] x7i5/?[47]
[16 2] ^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO A USED POINT WITHOUT A MISSION
[163] PJJM[66;75]-^(l-7Ai?[41] )x (l-FAi?[42] )x (l-FAi?[47] )






f^THIS PROGRAM USES A SERIES OF PROBABILITY VALUES FROM A VECTOR iVAR)
ftTO CREATE THE THIRD LEVEL OF THE Pil.J) MATRIX,
P\SEE PROGIMTX FOR EXPLANTATION
t I
MOVING TO AND SHOOTING FROM A POINT'
067 ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 68,71 AND 92
r69 ENROUTE to NEW FIRE POINT WITH A MISSION 70,72 AND 92
p7 5 ENROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT 76,79 AND 92
p77 ENROUTE TO USED FIRE POINT WITH A MISSION 7 8,81 AND 92
PIJMLie? ,69, 75,77 )i92l'(-VARLll
PIJML67 i68:i^VARL2:ixil-VARLll )
PIJML69;70l^VARl2:\^il-VARLll )
PIJML75 i76l^VARL2l^ il-VARLl'] )
PIJML77 ;78l^VARL2:\xil'VARLll )
ftTHE PROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT FIRE POINT WITHOUT INCIDENT
PIJML67 ;7i:\^(l-VAR\:2l )x(i-VARLll )
PIJML69',72l<r(l-VARL2:[ )x(l-F^ECl] )
PIJML75i79l'(ril-VARL21 )>^il-VARLll )
PIJML77 ;Sl2<-(l-VARL2:i )x(i-VARL12 )
p68 DOWN ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT 71 AND 9 2
70 DOWN ENROUTE TO NEW FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 71,72 AND 92
fi76 DOWN ENROUT TO USED FIRE POINT 7 9 AND 92
p78 down ENROUT TO USED FIRE POINT WITH MISSION 79,81 AND 92
PIJMLieS ,70 ,76 ,7B);92l'(rVARl32
PIJML70i711'^VARl^2x(l-VARL3:i )
PIJM17 B ',7 9:\^VARm2x il-VARL32 )





[31] PUMnSiSll-frd-VARLdl )x(i-VARLnl )
[32] 71 IN HIDE POSITION AT NEW POINT WAITING FOR MISSION 72,8C
[33] PIJML71i80l^VARl5l
[34] O.PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION BEFORE BEING DETECTED
[35] PIJML71i721<-(l-VARL5l)




[3 9] (^PROBABILITY OF FIRING WHEN READY {AND MISSILE FIRES)'
[40] PIJMZ72;S5l'f-(l-VARL^5:i)x(l-VARL6l)
[41] r73 new point laid WAITING FIRE COMMAND 7 4, 8 2, 8
[42] PIJML73i7Ul<-VARL^5l
[43] PIJM173 i82l<-(l-VARln51 )>iVARl7l
[44] (^PROBABILITY OF SHOOTING WHEN COMMANDED BEFORE DETECTION'
[45] PIJML73;85l^il-VARm5l )x(l-VARl7l )
[46] P74 MISFIRE ON NEW POINT 8 5,86
[47] PJJM[74;85]-«-7A/?[46]
[4 8] (^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO TRANSLOAD POINT TO GET ANOTHER ROUND'
[49] PJe7W[74;86]^(l-7Ai?[46] )
[5 0] SHOOTING FROM A USED POINT (ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS'
[51] P79 IN HIDE POSITION AT USED POINT WAITING FOR MISSION 80.81
[52] PIJML7 9i80l<-VARl<5l
[53] (^PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION
[54] PJc7MC79;81]-«-(l-7.qi?[9] )
[5 5] P80 IN HIDE POSITION DETECTED WAITING FOR MISSION 81,93
[56] PJe7W[80;93]^7.^/?[10]
[57] (^PROBABILITY OF GETTING A MISSION BEFORE BEING DESTROYED IN HIDEiPD]
[58] PJc7W[80;81]-^(l-7>li?[10] )
[59] P81 ON USED (DETECTED) POINT WITH MISSION LAYING 82,84,85,93
[60] PJJM[81;93]-^7i^i?[ll]
[61] PJJM[81;82]-f-(l-7A/?[45] )x (l-7Ai?[ll] )>iVARLl2l
[62] PIJMLSl;8^1^VARL^51x(l-VARLlll
)
[63] r\PROBABILITY OF SHOOTING WHEN READY
[64] PIJML81i852^(l-VARLUbl )x(i-VARllll )x(l-VARLl2l
)
70





83 ABORT MISSION GO TO NEW POINT 68,71,93
PIJML83 ;932^VAR1151
PIJML83 iGSl-i-VARLieix il-VARLl5l )
^PROBABILITY OF GETTING TO POINT WITHOUT INCEDENT
PJc7M[83;71]-e-(l-7A/?Cl6] )x (l-y^;?Cl5] )
R84 MISFIRE ON USED (DETECTED) POINT 8 5,86,93








R86 ENROUTE TO BATTERY AREA TO TRANSLOAD 8 7,88,90
PIJML8e;90l^VARL50:\
PIJML86',87l^VARL511>c(l-VARL50l )
PiPROBABILITY OF ARRIVING AT TP
PIJML86',88l^(l-VARl5i:\ )xil-VARL50l )
87 DOWN WHILE ENROUTE TO TRANSLOAD POINT 88,90
PIJML87 ;90:\'<rVARL522
P<PROBABILBITY OF ARRIVING AT TRANSLOAD POINT
PJJM[87;88]-«-(l-yAi?C52] )
R88 TRANSLOADING AT TRANSLOAD POINT 1,3,9,11,67,69,75,77,91
PJc7WC88;91]-(-7A/?C53]
^PROBABILITY GOING TO A NEW POINT WITHOUT A MISSION^
PJJMC88;l]-^(l-7/l/?C53] )x (l-VAi?[42] )xFA/?[47] xFiqP[48]
PJt7WC88;67]-^(l-7iqi?[53] )x (l-7Ai?[42.1 )xFAP[U7] x (l-y,^i?[i+8] )
(^PROBABILTY OF GOING TO A NEW POINT WITH A MISSION
PIJMl88;3l'(rCl-VARL53l )xyAi?[U2] xI^Ai?[U7] xF^HC48]
71
[99] PIJMl88i69l<ril-VARZ53l )xVARm2l^VARm7']xil'VARmBl )
[100] ^PROBABILITY OF GOING TO A USED POINT WITHOUT A MISSION
[101] PIJMl88',9l^(l-VARL531)^(l-VARLn2l)^il-VARlK7l)xVARLn8l
[102] PJc7M[88;ll]"«-(l-I^;ii?[53] )x7A/?[42] x (1-7A/?[U7] )x7Ai?[48]
[103] PIJMl88i7 5l<r(l-VARL53:\ )x (l-7Ai?[42] )x (l-yAi?[47] )^(l-VARm8l )
[104] PIJML88 ;771fr(l-VARl53l )xVARln21xil-VARLn7l )x(l-VARL^8l )
[105]
















PiTHIS PROGRAM ASKS THE PROGRAMMER FOR EXPECTED DURATIONS OF TIME FOR
(^EVENTS WHICH WILL BE USED TO CREATE THE Tilt J) MATRIX, ALL VALUES ARE
RSTORED IN VECTOR ^TIME^,
t I
TIME-^lOpQ
'ENTER THE FOLLOWING EXPECTED TIMES IN MINUTES'
'TRAVEL TIME BETWEEN LOCAL TRANSLOAD POINT AND A FIRE POINT'
TIME Zll^D
'EXPECTED TIME NEEDED TO RECOVER WHEN DOWN FOR MAINTENANCE EN ROUTE*
TIMEZ2l^n
'TIME WAITING IN HIDE POSITION UNTIL MISSION RECEIVED'
TIMELSl^U
'TIME TO TRAVEL FROM HIDE POSITION TO THE FIRE POINT AND LAY WEAPON*
TIMEmi^D
'TIME UNTIL RECEIVING COMMAND TO FIRE WHEN LAID AND WAITING'
TIME LSI ^U
'TIME NEEDED TO CONDUCT MISFIRE PROCEDURES AND FIRE AGAIN'
TIME 162 ^U
'TIME NEEDED TO CONDUCT MISFIRE PROCEDURES AND REJECT BAD ROUND'
TIME 17 2-^0
'TIME UNTIL RECEIVING COMMAND TO ABORT MISSION WHEN LAID AND DETECTED*
TIMELS^^U
'TIME TO DISPLACE WHEN ABORTING MISSION'
TIMEL91^U
'TIME TO DISPLACE AFTER ROUND IS FIRED'
TIMEllOl^U
'TIME NEEDED TO TRANSLOAD AT A FIRE POINT AFTER A MISSION IS SHOT'
TIMELIU^U
'TIME NEEDED TO TRANSLOAD AT A FIRE POINT AFTER A MISFIRE (CON 1)'
TIMELl22^n
73
[31] ^TIME NEEDED TO TRANSLOAD EN ROUTE AND TRAVEL TO NEXT POINT iCON 1)
[32] rJME[13]^D
[3 3] 'TRAVEL TIME BETWEEN BATTERY POSITION AND A FIRE POINT'
[34] TIMELl^l^rU
[3 5] 'EXPECTED TIME TO TRANSLOAD AT TRANSLOAD POINT OR BATTERY POSITION'
[36] TIMEll5l<rU






[40] 'TIME UNTIL BECOMING DETECTED WHILE IN HIDE POSITION (DETECTED POINT
[41] riME[18]-f-D
[4 2] 'ADDITIONAL TIME IN DETECTED HIDE POSITION BEFORE MISSION RECEIVED^
[43] TIMEL192^U
[44] 'TIME UNTIL BECOMING DETECTED WHILE LAID WAITING FOR A COMMAND TO'






nTHIS PROGRAM USES VALUES STORED IN VECTOR ^TIHE* TO COMPUTE TU»J)
(^VALUES AND CREATE THE Til, J) MATRIX iTIJM)
.
(^FIRST THE MATRIX IS CREATED
t I
TIJM<- 93 93 pO
t T
f^THEN THE VALUES ARE COMPUTED
t I









TIJML67 1 (68,71 )]-«-rJWECl]
TIJML69; (70 ,72)l^TIMELi:\
TIJML75i (76,79):\^TIMEL11
TIJML77; (78 , 81 )]-^rJM£'Cl]
PiTRANSLOAD POINT'
rie7MC(34,3 6,H2,4U,67,69,7 5,77);92]-e-0.5xrJME[l]
f^TIME UNTIL BEING DESTROYED EN ROUTE TO FIRE POINT FROM
P^BATTERY POSITION
rJt7MC(l,3,9,ll);92]-«-0.5xriMF[m]
PiTIME UNTIL BEING DESTROYED EN ROUTE TO LOCAL TRANSLOAD POINT
qFROM FIRE POINT*
TIJMLOl ,6n)i90l^0 ,5xTIMElll






































TIJML86 1901^0 . S^TIMELll










































































TIJML7 9 i 802^0 , 5XTIMEL31
ftTIME NEEDED TO LAY WEAPON




TIJML7 2i (7 3,74,8 5)]-«-rJME[4]
TIJML81; (8 2,8H,8 5)]-f-2'IWE[4]




[99] riJMCUO; (41,52 )]^rjWE[5]
[100] rJc7M[49; (51,52 )]-«-2'IME[5]
[101] TIJML73i(7n,85)l'(rTIMEL5l
[102] riJW[82; (84,85 )]<-2'IME[5]












[110] prJWE NEEDED TO CONDUCT MISFIRE PROCEEDURES AND REJECT BAD ROUND















[121] prJME rc? DISPLACE {ABORT MISSION)
[122] rJe7AJ[17; (2,5)]-f-rJME[9]
[123] ^./^[SO; (35,38 )]-f-rJME[9]
[124] rjJW[83; (68,71 )]-«-2'IME[9]
[12 5] PiTIME TO DISPLACE AFTER ROUND IS FIRED
[126] rJJW[19; (20,23,2 5,27,29,31)]-t-riME[10]
[127] TIJMlb2\ (53,56,58,60,62,64)]-«-rJMff[10]
[128] rjJM[8 5;86]-f-rJME[10]
[129] ^TIME NEEDED TO TRANSLOAD AT A FIRE POINT AFTER A MISSION IS SHOT
[130] rJJM[20; (47,48 )]-*-rJMff[ll]
[131] rJJM[53; (80,81 )]*-Z'JWE[ll]

































PiTIME UNTIL BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANSLOADING
2'JJM[(3 3,66,88);93]^0.5xrJME[15]
f\TIME UNTIL BECOMING DETECTED WHILE IN HIDE POSITION {UNUSED POINT)
ric7M[5;14]-^rJME[17]
riJM [ 3 8 ; 47 ] -^riME C 1 7 ]
rjJW[71;80]^riWECl7]













[169] r^TIME UNTIL BEING DESTROYED WHILE HIDING
[170] rJJM[(14,47,80);93]-<-0.5xrJMff[3]
[171] r^TIME UNTIL BEING DESTROYED WHILE LAID WAITING FOR COMMAND TO FIrI
[172] rJJW[(16,49,82);93]-f-0.5xriM£:[5]
[173] f\TIME UNTIL BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANSLOADING EN ROUTE TO
[174] f\FIRE POINT
[175] rJ«7M[( 23, 2 5, 56, 58); 89] -f-0.5xrJWE[13]
[176] ^TIME UNTIL BEING DESTROYED BEFORE DEPARTING A FIRE POINT
[177] PtAFTER A MISSION
[17 8] rjJW[(18,19,51,52,84,85);93]'«-0.5xrJW£:[10]
[17 9] aTIME UNTIL BEING DESTROYED WHILE TRANSLOADING AT A FIRE POINT
^
[180] RAFTER A MISSION
[181] rJJW[(20,53);93]-f-0.5xrJW£'[ll]





































f^THIS FUNCTION USES TRANSITION AND TIME MATRICES ASSOCIATED
qWITH the MARKOV CHAIN TO SOLVE FOR THE EXPECTED TIME TO ABSORPTION
f=iAND THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF VISITS TO A TRANSIENT STATE PRIORTY
^ABSORPTION,
p COMPUTE COMPONENTS OF P;
/?^ 8 8 "5 ^-PIJM
R CREATE FUNDAMENTAL MATRIX
Q^ 88 88 ^PIJM
J-e- 88 88 pl,88p0
W<-^(I-Q)
fl ASSIGN PROBABILITIES OF ABSORPTION
U^h/+ . xi?
R COMPUTE MEAN SOJOURN TIME FOR EACH STATE
MST^'b^+ZPIJMxTIJM
fi COMPUTE EXPECTED TIME TO ABSORPTION FROM A GIVEN STATE
TABST^iW+.'xMSDieO
rHERE THE NUMBER OF MISSILES FIRED IS COMPUTED ACCORDING TO THE
^CONFIGURATION, CONFIGURATION ONE AND TWO START IN STATE 5 AND
PiHAVE SHOT A MISSILE EACH TIME THEY REACH STATES 19, 52, AND 85.
^CONFIGURATION TWO STARTS IN CONFIGURATION 71 AND HAS SHOT A MISSILE
f^EACH TIME IT REACHES STATE 85.
I t
f\ COMPUTE THE NUMBER OF MISSILES FIRED
^iVAR[.U9:\=3)pLOOP
FiCONFIGURATION ONE OR TWO
NUMROUND^WL5il9l+WL5i52l+Wl5i852
TABS^TABSTLBl
'NUMBER OF MISSILES FIRED EQUALS'
NUMROUND
81








[3 9] 'NUMBER OF MISSILES FIRED EQUALS'
[40] NUMROUND






























f^THIS PROGRAM ALLOWS THE USER TO CHANGE THE CONFIGURATION OF THE
PiLAUNCHER WITHOUT ALTERING OTHER INPUT DATA, ONCE THE
uCHANGE IS ENTERED A NEW 'P' MATRIX AND '2" MATRIX ARE COMPUTED,
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